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The Natural Property Rights 
Straitjacket: The Takings Clause, 
Taxation, and Excessive Rigidity 
Eric Kades* 
Natural property rights theories have become the primary lens through 
which conservative jurists and scholars view the Constitution’s main 
property rights provision, the Takings Clause. One of their most striking 
arguments is that progressive income taxation — applying higher tax 
rates to higher incomes — is an unconstitutional taking of wealthy 
taxpayers’ property. This has become part and parcel of well-established 
battle lines between conservative property rights advocates and their 
liberal counterparts. What has gone unnoticed is that the very same 
argument deployed against progressive taxation also deems regressive 
taxation — applying lower tax rates to higher incomes — an 
unconstitutional taking of poorer taxpayers’ property. Combined with the 
stricture against progressive taxation, this means that natural property 
rights theory maintains that there is one and only one constitutional 
income tax: a “flat” that applies the same rate to incomes at all levels. 
The first and most novel contribution of this Article is the contention 
that the cardinal sin of natural property rights theories is not excessive 
protection of the propertied class but rather the imposition of a straitjacket 
on policymaking. This problem is not limited to taxation. Natural 
property rights strictures against debtor relief, combined with a symmetric 
argument against creditor relief, end up imposing similarly binding 
shackles on the monetary authorities. Indeed, natural property rights 
theories categorically reject redistribution even if it helps the wealthy as 
well as the poor. 
 
 * Copyright © 2018 Eric Kades. Thomas Jefferson Professor of Law, William & 
Mary Law School. Thanks to Benito Arruñada, Lynda Butler, Peter Byrne, Jim Ely, Bob 
Hockett, Alexandra Klass, Heinz Klug, Frankie McCarthy, Tom Merrill, Ruth Okediji, 
Ilya Somin, James Stern, and to participants in the Brigham-Kanner Property Rights 
Conference in The Hague, October 20-21, 2016. A special thanks to Nancy Combs for 
extensive comments and improvements. 
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The second thesis of this Article is that the natural property rights case 
against progressive taxation has foundational faults. It fails to address the 
fact that charity is a public good that is undersupplied by “the market” — 
that is, private charity. It also fails to offer any explanation of how to 
choose the proper tax basis, for example income, sales, wealth, etc. There 
are some real quandaries here. The fact that a flat wealth tax likely 
approximates a progressive income tax seriously undermines the case 
against progressive taxation in general. 
The last section of the Article does identify one point of agreement with 
natural property rights theorists: the Takings Clause does impose some 
constraints on legislatures’ power to tax. The common ground ends, 
however, with that basic observation. This Article suggests that a very 
modest “Continuous Burdens Principle” does bar tax laws that impose 
dramatically different tax burdens on taxpayers of similar economic 
circumstances. This principle forbids only relatively extreme taxes that 
single out individuals or small groups for particularly outsized tax 
burdens, and thus in stark contrast to natural property rights theory does 
not straitjacket tax policy. 
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Of a natural right who has any idea? I, for my part, I have 
none: a natural right is a round square or an incorporeal 
body. . . . A natural right is a son that never had a father. By 
natural right is meant, a sort of a thing which is to have the 
effect of law, which is to have an effect paramount to that of 
law, but which subsists not only without law, but against law: 
and its characteristic property, as well as sole and constant 
use, is the being and everlasting and irreconcilable enemy of 
law. . . . A natural right is a species of cold heat, a sort of dry 
moisture, a kind of resplendent darkness.1 
INTRODUCTION 
Natural property rights theories have enjoyed a significant 
renaissance over the last thirty-odd years. Two leading lights of this 
movement have been Richard Epstein and the late Justice Antonin 
Scalia, the former for his scholarship2 and the latter for his judicial 
opinions.3 Based largely on their work, natural rights theory has 
become the dominant framework for conservative interpretations of 
 
 1 Jeremy Bentham, Supply Without Burthen, or Escheat Vice Taxation, in 1 JEREMY 
BENTHAM’S ECONOMIC WRITINGS 279, 334-35 (Werner Stark ed., 1952). 
 2 See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT 
DOMAIN (1985); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974); Eric R. Claeys, 
Jefferson Meets Coase: Land-Use Torts, Land and Economics, and Natural Property Rights, 
85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1379 (2010) [hereinafter Jefferson Meets Coase]. 
 3 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (inventing the “total 
taking” rule); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (requiring nexus 
between substance of regulation and state’s public purpose for regulation). 
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the key constitutional provision on property rights, the Takings 
Clause.4 With the election of Donald Trump as President, 
conservatives can expect to maintain a majority on the Supreme Court 
for some time. 
Thus, the influence of natural rights theories on Takings Clause 
jurisprudence is likely to consolidate and expand in coming years. 
This Article argues that the natural property rights paradigm has two 
elemental flaws: it constrains public policymakers to a far greater 
extent than previously realized, and its case against any and all forms 
of redistribution is built on analytic errors. To the extent that the 
Supreme Court does continue to apply a natural property rights lens 
to the Takings Clause, policymaking will be excessively constrained 
and erroneously biased against all forms of redistribution in an age of 
spiking socioeconomic inequality. 
Like virtually all contested constitutional issues, disputes over 
property rights and the Takings Clause tend to fall into conservative 
versus liberal perspectives. Those on the right argue for strong private 
property rights and hence an expansive reading of the Takings Clause 
that significantly limits the state’s regulatory powers.5 Those on the 
left, in contrast, argue that the government has robust authority to 
regulate and that property rights must sometimes yield to larger social 
needs.6 
One of the core debates between left and right is over redistributory 
policies like the progressive income tax and welfare programs. On the 
right, some leading natural rights theorists have argued that property 
rights in labor mean that the government simply cannot tax labor 
income at all.7 Less extreme, more practical natural rights theorists 
have argued that although the state may tax labor income, it cannot 
impose a progressive8 income tax because such disproportionate 
taxation of the wealthy violates the Takings Clause.9 
 
 4 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation.”). 
 5 See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 2; NOZICK, supra note 2; Claeys, Jefferson Meets 
Coase, supra note 2. 
 6 See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, A Statement of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL 
L. REV. 743, 744 (2009); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments 
on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1257-58 
(1967); Joseph W. Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 702-
06 (1988). 
 7 NOZICK, supra note 2, at 169. 
 8 A progressive income tax imposes higher actual (average) tax rates as income 
rises. 
 9 See EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 262-69; infra Part III. 
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An overlooked and important corollary to the natural rights case 
against progressive income taxation is a precisely symmetric argument 
that regressive income taxation10 is an unconstitutional taking from 
the poor. Note that regressive taxation is no theoretical oddity: the tax 
system of each state in the Union is regressive.11 Under a natural rights 
reading of the Takings Clause, the federal income tax is an 
unconstitutional taking from the wealthy and the overall tax system in 
each state is an unconstitutional taking from the less affluent. 
Natural property rights theories, then, permit exactly one type of 
tax: so-called “flat” taxes that impose the same percent rate on all 
income, purchases, or wealth. Caught up in the partisan battles over 
redistribution, scholars have overlooked natural property rights 
theories’ astoundingly constrictive implications for tax policy. The first 
major thesis of this paper, in section I.D, is that the biggest strike 
again natural property rights theory is not that it is anti-redistributory, 
but rather that it places those making tax policy into a straitjacket: 
they have no degrees of freedom with which to address a complex and 
changing world. Given knotty issues of efficiency, fairness, and their 
interplay, limiting a modern state to precisely one tax is 
extraordinarily limiting. It is vanishingly unlikely that one-size-fits-all 
flat taxes are optimal for all times, places, and circumstances. 
The straitjacket imposed by natural property rights readings of the 
Takings Clause is by no means limited to taxation. This Article offers 
two additional examples. First, the natural property rights per se rule 
against any form of debtor (or creditor) relief turns out to constrain 
monetary policymakers (e.g., the Federal Reserve Board in the United 
States) every bit as tightly as it constricts tax policy. Unanticipated 
inflation is deemed a taking from creditors and unintended deflation is 
a taking from debtors. Thus, just as the only flat taxes pass muster, the 
single permissible monetary policy under natural property rights is 
one that not only announces target inflation/deflation rates, but also 
achieves them. Not only is such a singular target difficult for monetary 
authorities to achieve, it may also be suboptimal. 
Second, natural property rights theory bars redistributory policies 
even if there is clear evidence that such measures benefit the wealthy 
as well as the rest of society. Many might think that this is a purely 
theoretical point based on the observation that redistribution cannot 
possibly benefit the affluent from whom money is being taken. Recent 
 
 10 Regressive income taxation is simply the opposite of progressive taxation — an 
income tax under which actual tax rates fall as income increases. See supra note 8. 
 11 See infra Section I.C.1. 
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scholarship, however, suggests that inequality may impose real costs 
on the rich as well as the poor: it produces social unrest and 
unpleasant interactions that may raise stress levels of rich and poor 
alike.12 That natural property rights theories disallow redistribution 
that benefits those all along the income distribution is deeply 
troubling. 
These examples motivate this Article’s first thesis, that natural 
property rights theory’s cardinal sin is that it imposes far too tight a 
straitjacket on policymakers in a number of areas. Rejecting the 
school’s reading of the Takings Clause provides the Federal Reserve 
with enough maneuvering room to deal with the variegated surprises 
of macroeconomics, from financial panics to foreign currency market 
disruptions to increasing prices of imports. It enables the legislature to 
address inequality that threatens the health of the wealthy and the 
poor alike. 
This last example justifies redistribution based on its benefits to 
wealthier as well as less affluent citizens. It does not address the 
natural property rights case that “pure” redistribution — policies that 
transfer wealth from rich to poor without any benefits to the rich — 
violates the Takings Clause. Part I of this Article turns back to the 
long-standing, partisan debate over progressive taxation, welfare, and 
other redistributory policies. It identifies four serious flaws in natural 
property rights arguments against pure redistribution. 
First and foremost, natural rights theories fail to acknowledge that 
charity, like the police force, is a public good: because of free-riders 
and hold-outs, markets will undersupply it. The usual provider of 
public goods is of course the government. Thus, redistribution is 
simply delivery of charity by state action, necessitated by suboptimal 
private charity. 
Second, natural property rights theories have devoted far too little 
time explaining the factors that should be used to select the tax base. 
For example, a flat tax using wealth as a base (as opposed to income) 
approximates a progressive tax on income. Not all flat taxes are 
equivalent, and natural property rights theory provides no grounds on 
which to select one tax base (e.g., income) over another (e.g., wealth). 
Third, some natural property rights theorists seem to advocate a 
new efficiency standard that is even more infeasible than the usually 
unachievable Pareto efficiency.13 This new standard’s advocates do not 
 
 12 RICHARD WILKINSON & KATE PICKETT, THE SPIRIT LEVEL: WHY GREATER EQUALITY 
MAKES SOCIETIES STRONGER 31-43 (2009). 
 13 A Pareto-efficient action is one that does not decrease the welfare of anyone and 
increases the welfare of at least one person. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
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seem to have realized that they have invented a new efficiency 
standard, and commentators as well have not focused on this 
important innovation. The standard requires that all public projects 
benefit each citizen in proportion to their pre-existing wealth. In 
pedestrian terms, when government policies increase the size of the 
social pie, the relative size of each slice must remain the same. 
Whatever appeal this new standard might have, its patent 
unattainability makes it a fool’s foundation for policymaking. 
Finally, in a soft echo of the straitjacket thesis of Part I, natural 
property rights theory has an excessive bias in favor of the status quo. 
As tastes (driving demand for goods and services) and technologies 
(driving supply) evolve ever more rapidly, the need for some flexibility 
and evolution in property rights becomes ever more important. As the 
United States faces such a dynamic future, we face the specter of a 
Supreme Court majority wedded to interpretations of the Takings 
Clause that will prevent the legislative and executive branches from 
responding to change nimbly and effectively. 
The twin theses of (i) the policy straitjacket imposed by natural 
property rights theories and (ii) the fundamental defects in its case 
against pure redistribution might create the impression that the 
Takings Clause imposes no limitations on the state’s power to tax. Part 
III draws on prior scholarship to dispel any such notion. It argues that 
the Takings Clause requires that tax burdens make no large jumps 
between taxpayers whose wealth or incomes differs by only a small 
amount. This imposes quite modest restrictions on the taxation power 
of the legislature, providing ample room for a wide range of 
progressive (and regressive) tax policies. 
I. TAXATION AND THE NATURAL PROPERTY RIGHTS STRAITJACKET 
A. A Natural Property Rights Model of Takings 
Natural (property) rights theories at their root attempt to build a 
wall against legislative encroachment on private property rights by 
very expansive readings of constitutional clauses in general and the 
Takings Clause in particular. This distinguishes natural property 
rights theory from most contemporary property scholarship, which 
adopts the positivist view that property rights exist only when created 
by the sovereign (be it a King or a legislature elected by a majority of 
voters).14 This Article does not delve into the extensive efforts to 
 
LAW 12-13 (7th ed. 2014). 
 14 See supra note 6. 
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justify natural property rights. At root, such arguments are rooted in 
purported universal notions of justice. To give one example from the 
towering leader of the natural property rights school, Richard Epstein 
observes that “the state should prohibit murder because it is wrong; 
murder is not wrong because the state prohibits it.”15 Eric Claeys 
expands on the theme, arguing that cornerstones of America’s 
constitutional order instantiate natural rights. His “American natural-
rights morality” 
refers to a common political morality that amalgamates Anglo-
American law and several different philosophical and religious 
theories of liberty. The amalgamation is restated explicitly and 
generally in the Declaration of Independence and many 
Founding Era state constitutions. [He] hypothesizes here that 
it served as a common political morality until at least the end 
of the first third of the twentieth century.16 
Natural property rights thus are conceptually antecedent to the 
formation of the state. This means that natural law analogs to the 
common law torts like battery, trespass, and nuisance existed even 
before governments formed and established courts to vindicate the 
natural rights protected by these remedies. When individual property 
owners do come together to form a state under fundamental law like a 
constitution, Anglo-American natural rights theorists, dating back to 
at least Sir Edward Coke, have maintained that the common law 
simply embodies natural rights and that the state by force of logic 
cannot obtain rights any greater than those of the owners ceding some 
of their natural rights.17 If private parties have no right to batter each 
other, trespass on neighbors’ land, or maintain nuisances on their 
own, then the government similarly has no such rights. 
Natural rights theories hold that the key power that citizens and 
property owners confer on the state is the power to force various 
exchanges. To give the most important examples, the government can 
force the populace to 
 
 15 EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 5-6. 
 16 Claeys, Jefferson Meets Coase, supra note 2, at 1394. 
 17 See Steven G. Calabresi & Sofia M. Vickery, On Liberty and the Fourteenth 
Amendment: The Original Understanding of the Lockean Natural Rights Guarantees, 93 
TEX. L. REV. 1299, 1305 (2015) (“Sir Edward Coke would have identified such rights 
with the common law of England and with the ancient constitution, which had 
produced it.”); see also id. at 1310 (stating that state constitutional guarantees of rights 
were likely “inherent in the common law”). 
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• pay taxes in return for public services; 
• live with regulations of property rights in return for 
regulation of others; and 
• sell their property in return for “just compensation” — the 
Takings Clause.18 
In his still-preeminent articulation of natural property rights,19 one of 
Epstein’s central analytic moves is the assertion that the Takings 
Clause applies to all three of these examples (and many more), not 
just the last one. There is very little historical or textual support for 
this reading of the clause,20 but Epstein says that it reflects bedrock 
principles in the Lockean system of property rights that he maintains 
the Founders intended to create.21 
In perhaps an even bolder expansion of the Takings Clause’s 
application, natural property rights theorists argue that all public laws 
and projects must provide compensation such that everyone’s share of 
the economic pie22 remains the same. As Claeys puts it, “[b]ecause the 
social compact creates a partnership for the mutual improvement of 
morally equal partners, its laws must work to enlarge the advantage of 
every partner.”23 In a simple case where a house is taken to build a 
highway, this means that just compensation must equal the market 
value of the home. In the much more complex case of a tax, it means 
 
 18 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 19 Other natural property rights advocates cite Epstein liberally and positively. See, 
e.g., Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property Rights, 88 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1549 passim (2003) [hereinafter Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property 
Rights]. Although Claeys has some quibbles with Epstein’s version of natural property 
rights, he states clearly that “[s]till, Epstein’s . . . approach[] would generate results 
satisfactory to most natural-right-minded jurists.” Id. at 1647.  
 20 For a finding, based on a comprehensive survey of antebellum state 
constitutional law precedents, that rights declarations had “less practical legal 
significance with respect to property regulation,” see Calabresi & Vickery, supra note 
17, at 1311-12. 
 21 Eric Claeys, another consistent advocate for a natural rights theory of property, 
concurs that the Founding Fathers embraced the doctrine. “When Epstein defends his 
reading of the Takings Clause in light of contemporary principles of constitutional 
interpretation, his defense accords with this understanding of ‘original meaning’ 
methodology.” Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property Rights, supra note 
19, at 1564. 
 22 It is unclear from various accounts whether this rule applies to income or 
wealth. See infra Section II.B. I argue that it makes much more sense, within the 
system of natural property rights, to apply this rule to wealth. Id. 
 23 Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property Rights, supra note 19, at 1572. 
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that the benefits from state provision of public goods must be as close 
as possible to the taxes imposed on each citizen. 
This surprising powerful element of natural property rights theory 
has received far less attention than it deserves. As discussed infra 
section I.C, this goes far beyond the practical Kaldor-Hicks standard 
for efficiency (policies that increase in net national income)24 and even 
beyond the demands of the impractical Pareto standard (policies that 
make no one worse off and at least one person better off)25 by 
requiring every state act to increase everyone’s wealth by the same 
percentage. I label this standard “super-Pareto efficiency.” Whenever 
the government acts, it must compensate every property owner who 
suffers a disproportionate loss.26 
To determine exactly when the government must compensate those 
suffering losses from governmental action, Epstein articulates a four-
part natural property rights standard:27 
(i) Did the government take some property right of an owner? 
(ii)Was the property taken for a public use? 
(iii) Did the government have a justification for the taking that 
obviates the obligation to pay compensation? 
(iv)Did the government pay compensation implicitly, in the 
form of in-kind benefits to property owners who suffered 
some loss of property rights? 
Although much of the key vocabulary in this natural rights schema is 
in keeping with current Takings Clause doctrine, the doctrinal 
interpretation of these elements as natural rights diverges significantly 
from common understandings. We will consider each of these four 
elements in turn. 
Natural property rights theories must define “taking” much more 
broadly than current doctrine. To contemporary lawyers, a taking is 
either an exercise of the power of eminent domain (a forced sale of 
property) or excessive regulation (a so-called regulatory taking). 
Natural property rights theorists, true to their axiom that 
governmental powers are no more than the sum of ceded individual 
 
 24 POSNER, supra note 13. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Although Epstein does not consider the matter, his model also implies that 
those who benefit disproportionately must pay special taxes to disgorge their excessive 
gains. This is the only way to maintain the relative size of each citizen’s wedge of the 
societal pie. See infra Section II.C. 
 27 EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 31. 
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powers, treat any state act that would amount to conversion if done by 
a private actor as a taking. This means that any governmental act that 
decreases the wealth of a property owner is a taking. Thus, in addition 
to eminent domain, it is “natural” for natural rights theorists to define 
taxes, adverse changes in tort law rules, and imposition of workmen’s’ 
compensation statutes on employers, among other things, as takings. 
As this is only the first step in a property owner’s Takings suit, 
deeming all of these state acts as takings does not mean that the 
government must pay compensation. The government has two “outs.” 
First, by the ceded powers of the citizenry the government may have a 
justification for taking without paying (element 3 in the list above). 
Second, the very same state act that reduces a citizen’s wealth in one 
way may enhance it in another way (element 4). 
Before fleshing out these last two elements, we briefly consider the 
second element, the “public use” requirement. In line with current 
doctrine, natural rights theorists argue that the government cannot 
exercise its takings power unless the property taken is for such a 
public use. However, the natural rights definition of that phrase is 
much narrower than federal case law. Under Supreme Court doctrine, 
the public use requirement means only that the government must 
make a minimal case that the taking rationally serves some social goal 
and is not a taking from private party A for the benefit of private party 
B.28 Thus the state can take property from one private party and 
transfer it to another private party based on public uses such as urban 
renewal,29 or transitioning from a rental market for residences to an 
ownership market.30 
Natural rights theorists, however, believe that such an expansive 
reading of the public use requirement encourages rent-seeking citizens 
to invest in efforts to have the state use its eminent domain powers to 
help them obtain land for less than the owner’s reservation price.31 
Based on this concern, they argue that courts should construe “public 
use” to mean a public good in the economic sense. Such goods meet 
 
 28 See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (“[A] law that takes property 
from A[] and gives it to B: It is against all reason and justice, for a people to entrust a 
Legislature with SUCH powers; and, therefore, it cannot be presumed that they have 
done it.”). 
 29 See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 481 (2005); Berman v. Parker, 
348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954). 
 30 Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 230-32 (1984). 
 31 See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 161-81; Eric R. Claeys, Public Use Limitations 
and Natural Property Rights, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 877, 889-92; James W. Ely, Jr., Can 
the “Despotic Power” be Tamed? Reconsidering the Public Use Limitation on Eminent 
Domain, 17 PROB. & PROP. 31, 33-36 (2003). 
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two conditions. First, the consumption of public goods is non-
rivalrous. Abel’s consumption of police services does not prevent Baker 
from consuming the exact same services. This is not true for a 
hamburger. Second, public goods tend to be non-exclusive. It is hard to 
prevent any citizen from sharing in the consumption of police 
services. It is easy to exclude others from personally owned cars, 
books, computers, and hamburgers. Public goods are available for all 
to consume and hence governmental provision poses no risk of private 
rent-seeking. This Article shows that natural property rights theorists 
define public goods too narrowly by excluding charity (see section 
II.A.2 infra). This is a serious oversight. 
Questions about natural rights theories of justification and implicit 
compensation loom even larger. These two issues lie at the core of the 
most difficult issues in takings law. First, we consider justification. 
Remaining steadfastly true to the natural law view that state power can 
come only from the powers granted by individuals, the main 
justifications for taking property rights without compensation are 
analogs to private law doctrines akin to self-defense and consent. 
Property owners who interfere with their neighbors’ use and 
enjoyment of their land are committing nuisances. Their neighbors 
may invoke nuisance law to either shut down the offending use or 
obtain damages; the state may act in defense of all such harmed 
neighbors by regulating or even prohibiting offending land uses in 
defense of those harmed. Under broad natural rights conceptions of 
property rights, such state action is a taking, but it is justified (i.e., no 
compensation is due) as defense of the property of others. 
Government takings may also be justified by consent or assumption of 
the risk. Property owners who took title with clear notice of 
restrictions on the use of property have consented to the enforcement 
of such restrictions. Similarly, property owners aware that some 
property is subject to heavy and variable regulation (e.g., liquor-
manufacturing machinery) have assumed the risk that the legislature 
may change the rules of the game. 
Finally, and of greatest importance for this Article, a law or other 
state action may simultaneously burden and benefit a property owner. 
If the benefits are roughly equal to the burden, natural property rights 
theorists concede that compensation has been made for the otherwise 
unjustified taking of property. Epstein calls this “implicit in-kind 
compensation” (“IIKC”).32 Some zoning provisions qualify, such as 
 
 32 This is precisely the same thing as Justice Holmes’ “average reciprocity of 
advantage” in Pa. Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
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restrictions on the size of lawn signs: each owner loses some use value 
of her own property but obtains rights to restrict all of her neighbors’ 
land use in return. Other examples abound. The “automatic stay” 
barring creditors from initiating collection actions after a debtor has 
filed for bankruptcy certainly diminishes the rights of each creditor, 
but also preserves the bankrupt entity from inefficient dismantling by 
piecemeal foreclosures by all other claimants.33 Oil and gas 
“unitization” statutes do force owners of gas and oil deposits to 
participate in extraction of resources that they might disfavor, but they 
protect them from both races to extract these common pool resources 
and from holdouts who might block all mining efforts.34 
The central inquiry in determining whether IIKC exists is 
disproportionate impact. As noted above, forbidding all property 
owners from posting large signs appears to create benefits and burdens 
that are roughly equal across landowners. At the other extreme, a 
provision barring all improvement of a single lot in a city while 
permitting homes on every other lot in the jurisdiction has a starkly 
disproportionate impact on the sole disfavored property owner. The 
Supreme Court has deemed this the essence of a taking: “to bar 
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens 
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a 
whole.”35 
Having presented all of the components of natural rights models of 
takings, we can nutshell the doctrine in one sentence. If the state has 
taken property rights without police power justification and without 
notice (inherent limitations on title), and does not provide IIKC, it 
must pay the owner just compensation for the loss. 
B. The Natural Property Rights Case Against Progressive Taxation 
The expansive nature of the property rights postulated by natural 
rights theories mean that takings law applies not just to formal 
exercises of eminent domain and to regulations, but to all 
governmental actions — including taxation: “All the elements found 
in the analysis of takings re-emerge in the taxation context: takings, 
justification [police power] . . . , public use, and implicit 
compensation.”36 This assertion likely surprises many property rights 
scholars on first read, as traditional takings analysis usually applies to 
 
 33 See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2018).  
 34 See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52. §§ 287.1-287.15 (2018). 
 35 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
 36 EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 285. 
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government action that imposes large losses on one or a small group 
of property owners — so-called “narrow deep” takings. Natural 
property rights version of takings, however, applies as well to takings 
that are “broad and shallow.”37 
Taxes have the potential to inflict relatively modest losses on a 
broad swath of the population. Applying the four-step natural rights 
doctrine of takings to taxation, we begin by noting that taxes are 
takings — private citizens cannot tax their fellow citizens and so they 
cede such power, uninhibited, to the government. Second, we assume 
that the government uses tax proceeds to fund public goods, satisfying 
the public goods interpretation of the public use requirement. Third, 
there is no police power justification for collecting taxes from 
“innocent” citizens. The mere possession of money is not, after all, 
anything akin to a nuisance or a crime. 
The final and critical inquiry involves compensation. In the famous 
words of Justice Holmes, “[t]axes are what we pay for civilized society  
. . . .”38 In return for paying taxes, citizens receive a wide range of 
services (and occasionally some goods) from the government. In line 
with natural rights views of the Public Use clause, these are typically 
public goods — non-rivalrous and non-excludable goods that markets 
either undersupply or do not supply at all. The basket includes, inter 
alia, police protection, the judicial system, national defense, managing 
relations with foreign nations, road construction and maintenance, 
copious amounts of data, and other valuable information, regulating 
the supply of money, and environmental protection. 
The difficulty lies in trying to determine whether this broad basket 
of public services provides value at least roughly equivalent to taxes 
paid. In considering whether a tax is potentially a taking, Epstein and 
Calvin Massey take their cue from modern American practice and 
focus on the income tax.39 It is by far the largest tax assessed by the 
federal government40 and plays an important role in many states.41 
 
 37 Id. at 94. 
 38 Compania Gen. de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 275 
U.S. 87, 100 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 39 EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 295-303; Calvin R. Massey, Takings and Progressive 
Rate Taxation, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 85, 104 (1996). 
 40 Personal income taxes account for about 45% of federal revenues; the next 
largest source of revenues is the Social Security payroll tax, which accounts for only 
24%. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 2016 BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES 96-
97 (2016), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BUDGET-2016-BUD/pdf/BUDGET-2016-
BUD.pdf. 
 41 Briefing Book, State (and Local) Taxes, TAX POLICY CTR., http://www. 
taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-are-sources-revenue-state-governments (last 
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Income taxes come in three flavors, depending on whether and how 
marginal tax rates vary with income. Only the first two seem 
politically plausible.42 First, from the inception of the modern 
American income tax, the nation has had a progressive income tax. 
Progressive means that marginal rates increase with income, so that 
the overall percent of income paid in taxes also increases with 
income.43 For example, a progressive tax might assess a tax of $2,500 
on incomes of $25,000 (10%), $20,000 on incomes of $100,000 
(20%), and $120,000 on incomes of $400,000 (30%). 
Critics of progressive taxation suggest instead a flat tax, under 
which every household pays the same percent of income in taxes. To 
use the income levels from the previous paragraph paired with a flat 
tax of 20%, those earning $20,000 would pay $4,000; those earning 
$100,000 would pay $20,000, and those earning $400,000, $80,000. 
Clearly, and by design, a progressive tax imposes lighter burdens than 
a flat tax at the bottom of the income distribution and heavier burdens 
at the top. 
Under natural rights interpretations of the Takings Clause, the key 
question in deciding whether a tax is a taking is the match between 
amounts paid to the government and benefits received from the 
government. The greater the positive difference between taxes paid 
and benefits received, the greater the disproportionate impact. At some 
point, the disparity becomes a taking under a natural rights 
understanding of the Takings Clause. 
Measuring the burden on an income tax is trivial. Measuring the 
benefits of government services, however, is extraordinarily difficult. 
To calculate the extent to which such benefits vary with income, we 
must answer difficult questions about the many acts that a state might 
undertake, such as: 
• Are the benefits of police services the same dollar amount 
for each household regardless of income, or do they vary 
proportionately with income, or are such services much 
more valuable to the wealthy than the poor? 
 
visited Jan. 22, 2018). 
 42 The third alternative is a regressive income tax, which would impose tax rates 
that decline with income. The United States has never had a regressive income tax, and 
none of the many states with income taxes have such a rate structure. We will see, 
infra Section I.C.1, that every state’s tax system, overall, is regressive. 
 43 Federal Individual Income Tax Rates History, TAX FOUND., 
https://files.taxfoundation.org/legacy/docs/fed_individual_rate_history_nominal.pdf 
(last visited Dec. 30, 2017). 
  
1366 University of California, Davis [Vol. 51:1351 
• Do trade agreements with foreign nations help all 
Americans, or do they enhance the value of capital and 
skilled labor while eroding wages of unskilled laborers? 
• Does low inflation serve the interests of all citizens, or does 
it advantage creditors at the expense of debtors? 
If police services are worth the same amount to each household, then 
to match burdens with benefits calls for a head tax — a fixed dollar 
assessment on each taxpayer. This is a regressive tax: levying, for 
example, $1,000 from each household for police services would 
impose a burden of 5% for households with incomes of $20,000, 1% 
for households with incomes of $100,000, and only 0.25% on 
households with $400,000 incomes. If the benefits of police services 
truly are the same absolute amount for each household, Epstein’s 
canonical model of natural property rights proffers (to my knowledge) 
the first fairness justification for regressive taxation.44 A fairness 
argument for taxing the poor more heavily than the wealthy is, to say 
the least, unsettling. Even Massey, who believes progressive taxation is 
an unconstitutional taking, recoils at this prospect. He notes in 
passing that, “no one seriously advocates regressive rate taxation.”45 
At the other extreme, it might be that the benefits from police 
services increase sharply as income rises. Epstein concedes that this is 
possible. “In principle, the proper tax could be progressive if the 
benefits from government operations increased more steeply than 
private income.”46 Of course, the police are only one of the vast array 
of government services funded with tax revenues — for example, 
national defense, environmental protection, and road construction, to 
name a few. Each of these services might have a different profile in the 
manner in which benefits vary with income. In order to decide 
whether a progressive income tax is a taking, we would need to 
aggregate the benefits of all of these services by income. 
This is an incredibly difficult inquiry. Neither Epstein nor other 
natural rights scholars make any effort to address it, perhaps assuming 
that it is simply impossible. Based on little if any evidence, however, 
they generally reject the possibility that the benefits from public 
services might increase disproportionately with income. Noting that 
 
 44 There is a powerful efficiency justification for regressive “head taxes” that 
impose equal dollar tax liability on all citizens regardless of income or wealth: such 
taxes do not distort choices that actors make. See Lump-sum Tax, WIKIPEDIA, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lump-sum_tax (last visited Mar. 13, 2018). 
 45 Massey, supra note 39, at 87. 
 46 EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 297-98. 
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demand for most regular (non-public) goods rises with income, 
Epstein opines that “[a] similar assumption sees equally plausible in 
the context of public goods.”47 This likely is true: most taxpayers prefer 
more public goods to less. This innocuous assumption, however, says 
nothing about the possibility that the wealthy enjoy proportionally 
greater benefits when the state increases the supply of various pubic 
goods. Nevertheless, Epstein goes on to baldly assert that 
the flat tax seems better able to [minimize any mismatch 
between taxes paid and benefits received] than any other 
possible candidate. . . . The flat tax certainly gives a 
respectable matching, and it is clearly superior to a highly 
progressive tax, where the redistributive motive is powerful 
evidence of redistributive effects. . . . The flat tax is the most 
“natural” approach.48 
Natural property rights theorists do maintain that the motive behind a 
tax is an important factor in deciding whether it constitutes a taking. 
In the absence of solid data on the distribution of the benefits of 
public spending, Epstein offers this along with two additional proxies: 
(i) economic theory, and 
(ii) extent of disproportionate impact.49 
Of these three, however, he singles out disproportionate impact as 
being “of central importance.”50 There is no question that a 
progressive income tax has a disproportionate impact on the wealthy if 
natural rights theory is correct and the benefits from public services 
increase in lockstep proportion with income. This lies at the heart of 
the natural property rights argument that progressive taxation is a 
taking. 
C. The Symmetric Natural Property Rights Case Against Regressive 
Taxation 
This raises a question that natural property rights theorists do not 
ask: what of regressive taxation — taxation under which the share of 
income paid in taxes declines as income increases? Under the 
assumption that the benefits of public services increase in lock step 
 
 47 Id. at 297. 
 48 Id. at 298-99. 
 49 Id. at 201-02. 
 50 Id. at 204. 
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with income, regressive taxation must be deemed a taking from poorer 
households. This is a non-issue for the federal government as the 
federal income tax is progressive and its progressivity swamps the 
effects of other taxes that it imposes. It is an issue, however, for state 
taxation. The first section below documents the fact that the sum of 
major taxes (income taxes, property taxes, and sales taxes) in every 
state is regressive. The second section shows that an argument 
precisely parallel to the previous section on progressive taxes shows 
that under a natural rights interpretation of the Takings Clause, the 
taxation system of virtually every state in the Union is an 
unconstitutional taking of the property of less affluent Americans. 
1. Nearly Universal Regressive State Taxation 
States and their localities raise almost all of their revenue from some 
mix of income, property, and sales taxes. State income taxes tend to be 
progressive, though much less so than the federal income tax.51 
Indeed, a number of states have a flat income tax — one rate for all 
incomes — and others have only the mildest of progression in rates.52 
It is unclear whether property taxes are progressive or regressive. 
Although property taxes are assessed at a flat rate, the difficulty comes 
in trying to figure out how much of this tax landlords are able to pass 
on to renters. Renters tend to be much poorer than landlords, so the 
true incidence of the tax depends on this difficult empirical question.53 
It is the sales tax that makes overall taxation regressive in most 
states.54 Like the property tax, it is assessed at a uniform rate, making 
 
 51 For state income tax rates, see Nicole Kaeding, State Individual Income Tax Rates 
and Brackets for 2016, TAX FOUND. (Feb. 8, 2016), https://files.taxfoundation.org/ 
legacy/docs/TaxFoundation-FF500.pdf. For federal rates, see Federal Individual Income 
Tax Rates History, supra note 43. 
 52 Kaeding, supra note 51 (Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Utah have flat income tax rate structures; Alabama, 
Georgia, Kansas, Mississippi, New Mexico, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Virginia 
all have slightly progressive rates, but the top rate kicks in at such a low income level, 
often less than $20,000, making these income taxes virtually flat). 
 53 See, e.g., Robert J. Carroll & John Yinger, Is the Property Tax a Benefit Tax? The 
Case of Rental Housing, 47 NAT’L TAX J. 295, 310-11 (1994); George R. Zodrow, Who 
Pays the Property Tax?, 18 LAND LINES 14, 14 (2006); Jack Goodman, Houses, 
Apartments, and Property Tax Incidence 1-23 (Harvard Univ. Joint Ctr. for Hous. 
Studies, Working Paper No. W05-2, 2005), http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/ 
jchs.harvard.edu/files/w05-2.pdf. 
 54 See CARL DAVIS ET AL., INST. ON TAXATION & ECON. POLICY, WHO PAYS? A 
DISTRIBUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE TAX SYSTEMS IN ALL 50 STATES 1-2, 8-13 (5th ed. 2015), 
https://itep.org/wp-content/uploads/whopaysreport.pdf. 
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it sound like a flat tax. The rub, however, is that it is a consumption 
tax and the wealthy devote a smaller percentage of their income to 
consumption than do the poor.55 Put another way, the wealthy save at 
higher rates than the poor and the sales tax leaves those savings 
untouched. Thus, the poor tend to pay the “flat” sales tax on 100% of 
their income while a wealthy family might pay the flat sales tax on 
only 75% of their income if they save 25% of it. This translates into a 
sales tax rate that decreases when income increases — the definition of 
a regressive tax. 
The sales tax plays such a prominent role in state revenue systems 
that it tends to dominate the other components (income tax; property 
tax).56 The state of Washington relies almost entirely on a sales tax 
and has one of the most regressive taxation systems in the nation. 
Even Vermont, which arguably has the most poor-friendly tax system, 
still has a slightly regressive rate structure. The following figure shows 
the effective tax rates for these two extreme states across a range of 
incomes. 
Figure 157 
 
The extent of regressivity in Washington State is truly astonishing. 
The bottom quintile of the population pays about 17% of its income in 
taxes; the top percentile only about 3%. This means that the poorest 
 
 55 See Karen E. Dynan, Jonathan Skinner & Stephen P. Zeldes, Do the Rich Save 
More?, 112 J. POL. ECON. 397, 398 (2004). 
 56 DAVIS ET AL., supra note 54, at 8-13. 
 57 Data for graph from Institute on Taxation & Economic Policy (ITEP). Id. at 
119, 123.  
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households bear a tax burden almost six times as large as wealthiest 
households. It should come as no surprise that this violates Epstein’s 
disproportionate impact test (infra section II.B). The following figure 
illustrates the nationwide phenomenon of regressive state taxation by 
mapping the difference in tax rates between the bottom quintile and 
the top 1%. 
 
Figure 258: Effective Tax Rate, Bottom 20% – Top 1% 
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2. The Natural Property Rights Case Against Regressive Taxation 
Natural property rights theorists’ defense of a “flat tax” instead of a 
non-progressive tax is no accident. Although they do not make the 
case, a precise mirror image of the argument that progressive taxation 
is a taking from wealthier households under natural rights axioms 
demonstrates that regressive taxation is a taking from poorer families. 
The argument is almost a carbon copy of the argument against 
progressive taxation. Each of the four elements of the natural rights 
theory test59 is exactly the same: 
(i) taxes are a taking under the expansive definition of 
natural property rights; 
(ii) we assume that they are used to deliver public goods; 
(iii) the state has no police power justification for taking the 
money without any form of recompense; and 
 
 58 Id. at 23. 
 59 For the four-part natural rights standard for takings, see supra text 
accompanying note 27. 
  
2018] The Natural Property Rights Straitjacket 1371 
(iv) under the assumption that the benefits of public services 
rise in proportion with income, a regressive tax does not 
provide the poor with roughly equivalent benefits for 
their tax burden. 
As with the effect of progressive taxation on the wealthy, the public 
services that the poor receive as implicit in-kind compensation (IIKC) 
in return for their tax payments are insufficient. Thus, a regressive tax 
has a disproportionate impact on the poor and violates natural 
property rights interpretations of the Takings Clause. 
There is a formal distinction between the progressive federal income 
tax and regressive state sales taxes. Federal income tax rates are 
progressive in form as well as in substance: the rates in the statute 
explicitly call for tax burdens that increase in percent terms as 
incomes rise.60 State sales taxes, on the other hand, are formally flat. In 
form, if not in substance, state sales taxes are not regressive.61 
Natural rights theorists, however, cannot rely on this formal 
distinction to asymmetrically condemn progressive federal income 
taxation while permitting substantively regressive state sales taxes. Tax 
is the ultimate realm in which clever lawyers and accountants can use 
form to defeat substance.62 Indeed, this is part of the meat and 
potatoes of tax practice. If natural rights theory raises form above 
substance in determining whether a tax is a taking, it will have given 
up the game entirely. Just as a formally flat sales tax is substantively 
regressive, it is quite possible to design formally flat taxes that are 
substantively progressive. 
The most obvious (and feasible) examples involve selecting a 
different tax base. If state sales taxes can tax only consumption, the 
government instead could choose to tax only savings. As the wealthy 
save a much larger share of their wealth than the poor, a flat tax on 
savings would result in a substantively very progressive tax. Even 
more vividly, a flat tax on wealth, which is distributed much more 
unequally than income, would result in a quite progressive levy. 
Moreover, natural property rights scholars explicitly embrace 
substance over form. Epstein’s discussion of price controls proves this 
point. Specifically, Epstein notes that “[p]rice controls pass muster 
only if one looks to their neutral form — that everyone labors under 
 
 60 26 U.S.C. § 1 (2018) (“Tax imposed.”). 
 61 Scott Drenkard & Jared Walczak, State and Local Sales Tax Rates in 2015, TAX 
FOUND. (Apr. 8, 2015), https://taxfoundation.org/state-and-local-sales-tax-rates-2015. 
 62 See, e.g., Linda D. Jellum, Codifying and “Miscodifying” Judicial Anti-Abuse Tax 
Doctrines, 33 VA. TAX REV. 579, 595-624 (2014). 
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the same . . . price restriction — and ignores their economic 
effects . . . .”63 “Economic effects” of course is simply a synonym for 
“substance” as opposed to “form.” 
The disproportionate impact test itself directs us to examine 
substance, not form. Throughout his chapters on regulation and 
taxation,64 Epstein discusses disproportionate impact time and again. 
He does note that motivations can play a role in ferreting out taxes 
that violate the Takings Clause, but he explicitly states that “the more 
important arguments run to impact.”65 Still, some might argue that the 
progressive federal income tax is motivated by the desire to 
redistribute while state sales taxes are not. Under a natural rights 
reading of the Takings Clause this is a critical distinction, as 
redistribution is always a taking given the theory’s requirement that 
taxpayers receive services roughly equivalent to their tax bills.66 
Motivation, however, is not easy to pin down. There are some good 
reasons to think that redistribution is one of the motivations for the 
progressive federal income tax, but there are other motivations that 
might well predominate. For example, another frequently-cited 
motivation for progressive taxation is ability to pay. Charging a poor 
family making, for example, $10,000, 10% under a flat income tax 
might well drive them to the wall of starvation and homelessness. 
Under a natural rights reading of the Takings Clause, however, the 
state cannot avoid this outcome by, for example, creating a tax 
exemption for the first $10,000 of income. Such exemptions produce a 
disproportionate impact on wealthier citizens that translates into 
insufficient implicit compensation and thus an illegal taking. 
In addition, there may be more of a regressive motive behind state 
sales taxes than natural property rights theory permits. When 
Washington State voted on a ballot initiative to legalize income 
taxation that an old state supreme court decision deemed a violation 
of the state’s constitution, the largest contributor to the opposition 
came from Microsoft CEO and billionaire Steve Ballmer. Amazon 
founder and billionaire Jeff Bezos was another top donor.67 They may 
 
 63 EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 278. 
 64 Id. at 263-305 (chapters 17 (Regulation) & 18 (Taxation)). 
 65 Id. at 297. 
 66 There is an important caveat to this statement: it does not hold to the extent 
that (i) wealthy taxpayers either attach value to helping the less fortunate, or (ii) 
equalizing income provides benefits across all incomes. See infra text accompanying 
notes 100–103, 117–123. 
 67 Washington Income Tax, Initiative 1098, BALLOTPEDIA (2010), 
https://ballotpedia.org/Washington_Income_Tax,_Initiative_1098_(2010). 
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have made these contributions based on neutral policy principles, but 
one does not have to be excessively cynical to suspect that they were 
opposing the proposal because it would raise their total personal state 
tax bills substantially. To give but one more example, the timber 
industry intensively and successfully campaigned against reform of 
Alabama’s regressive tax system that contains extraordinarily favorable 
tax treatment for owners of forests.68 
Thus, the motivation behind regressive taxes may well not be benign 
but rather regressively redistributory. Given assertions that 
disproportionate impact is more important anyway, and the 
application of substance over form necessary to effectuate the natural 
property rights vision of the Takings Clause, the conclusion seems 
inescapable: the very same argument deployed to show that a 
progressive federal income tax is a taking also demonstrates that 
regressive state sales taxes are takings. 
D. An Unbearable Taxation Straitjacket 
Taken together, the last two sections demonstrate that the natural 
property rights model of the Takings Clause puts society in a real 
straitjacket. The only permissible taxes are a flat income tax or a flat 
sales tax. Massey declares that Congress lacks the constitutional 
authority to impose anything but a flat income tax. 
What Congress ought not be permitted to decide, if the 
Constitution is to be taken seriously, is whether it wishes to 
impose differential tax rates simply to dispossess some people 
of a disproportionately greater share of their income. A flat tax 
would simultaneously preserve legislative discretion and the 
raison d’etre of the Takings Clause, and would also be simple 
to administer judicially.69 
Epstein likewise declares flatly70 that “[i]f the ideal tax is a general 
revenue tax, then the state should be required to use it.”71 Although it 
is not entirely clear, by “general revenue tax” Epstein seems to mean a 
flat tax on either (i) income, or (ii) sales (i.e., on consumption). 
 
 68 Jeremy Lewis, Collection of Articles on Alabama’s Tax Reform Proposals, Sep. ’03, 
HUNTINGDON C., http://fs.huntingdon.edu/jlewis/al/ALtaxReform03arts.htm (last 
visited Dec. 30, 2017). 
 69 Massey, supra note 39, at 117. 
 70 Pun intended. 
 71 EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 291. 
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The effects of holding that the progressive federal income tax is 
unconstitutional are considerable: Congress would have to impose 
either a flat income tax or some sort of flat consumption tax (e.g., a 
national sales tax or a VAT).72 The effect of a holding that regressive 
state sales taxes violate the Takings Clause would be orders of 
magnitude larger, a constitutional earthquake completely off the 
Richter scale. Almost every state would have to abandon its sales tax 
and replace it with either a flat income tax or a flat sales tax coupled 
with a flat tax on savings. It is hard to identify a more sweeping 
incursion of federal constitutional law on the workings of state 
government. Even a transformative case like Brown v. Board of 
Education,73 ending de jure segregation, pales in comparison. Epstein’s 
interpretation of the Takings Clause would not only impose severe 
limits on the federal power of taxation. It would literally force almost 
all states to radically alter the way that they raise revenue. 
One might hope that natural rights scholars like Massey and Epstein 
would have specified some play in the joints of this rigid, restrictive 
reading of the Takings Clause’s application to taxation. That, however, 
is simply not the case. One way to make a sales tax less regressive is to 
introduce exemptions for goods and services on which the poor spend 
larger shares of their income than the wealthy. For instance, many 
states exempt food and residential rents from their sales taxes, and 
thereby make their taxes much less regressive. Both Massey and 
Epstein, however, are crystal clear that such ameliorative measures 
have no place in their interpretation of the Takings Clause. “Although 
exempting food from taxation may be advertised as an implicit subsidy 
to low-income individuals, it only invites the type of legislative 
mischief that uniform levels of taxation avoid, as for example the 
redistributive struggles between chain food stores and restaurants.”74 
What these natural rights scholars deem a subsidy is in substance 
under their assumptions a way of making sales taxes less regressive — in 
reality it is a reduction in a subsidy to the wealthy, not a positive 
subsidy for the poor. 
Indeed, it sometimes seems that a single-minded focus on universal 
and uniform taxation blinds natural rights theorists to critical 
 
 72 VAT is an acronym for a value added tax, a common levy in the rest of the 
world. See RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY 
AND PRACTICE 399-403 (5th ed. 1989). 
 73 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 74 EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 294. On similar grounds he argues that state 
“severance” taxes on natural resources exported from the state also violate the Takings 
Clause. Id. For similar arguments, see Massey, supra note 39, at 116-17. 
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substantive distinctions that provide strong grounds for non-uniform 
taxation. Consider, for example, Epstein’s argument that the Windfall 
Profits Tax Act of 198075 violated the Takings Clause. Congress 
enacted this tax in the wake of embargoes and foreign production cuts 
that raised the price of oil to unnaturally high (oligopolistic) levels.76 
American oil producers thus enjoyed supra-normal profits not based 
on efficiency, wise investments in production, or innovation, but 
rather because Saudi Arabia and other members of OPEC reduced 
supply and thus drove prices to artificially high levels. Taxation might 
not be the optimal reaction to uncompetitive pricing, but it certainly 
does constitute a special circumstance justifying a narrowly-targeted 
profits tax on one industry. In his extended (four page) discussion of 
the Windfall Profits Tax on Oil, however, Epstein omits any mention 
of the reason Congress enacted the tax and why taxing oligopolistic 
profits might serve as an important justification for it.77 
The rare occasions in which natural rights theorists express 
approval for deviations from uniformity are very hard to square with 
their otherwise absolute demands for universal and uniform taxation. 
Epstein, for example, argues that it is constitutional to tax capital 
income at different rates than labor income, and, in an even greater 
deviation from his norms, declares that it is permissible to “adopt 
different treatments for different types of assets.”78 He justifies these 
deviations from his prime directive on the rather flimsy basis of 
avoiding forced asset sales and neutralizing the effects of inflation.79 
Taxing capital income at a lower rate than labor income has a 
disproportionate regressive impact. Wealth is distributed highly 
unevenly, even more unequally than the current high levels of income 
inequality.80 Taxing interest, dividends, and other forms of capital 
 
 75 Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-223, 94 Stat. 229 
(1980). The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of this tax in a challenge 
brought under the Uniformity Clause of the Constitution. See United States v. 
Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74, 80 (1983). 
 76 For an overview of the Windfall Profits Tax and the background to its 
enactment, see id. at 75-79 (upholding tax to Uniformity Clause challenge). 
 77 See EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 289-93. 
 78 Id. at 301. 
 79 See id.  
 80 Javier Díaz-Giménez, Andy Glover & José-Victor Ríos-Rull, Facts on the 
Distribution of Earnings, Income, and Wealth in the United States: 2007 Update, 34 FED.  
RES. BANK MINNEAPOLIS Q. REV. 2, 4-5 tbl.2 (2011), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/ 
viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.589.344&rep=rep1&type=pdf; Arthur B. Kennickell, 
Ponds and Streams: Wealth and Income in the U.S., 1989 to 2007, at 34 (Fed. Reserve 
Bd., Fin. and Econs. Discussion Series, Paper No. 2009-13, 2009), 
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(wealth) income at a lower rate than labor income guarantees a 
regressive outcome — and so natural property rights theory must deem 
it unconstitutional under its own postulates that impute natural 
property rights onto the Takings Clause. To reduce the natural law 
perspective on taxation to a sound bite, “flat means flat,” and all income 
must be taxed at the same rate to avoid imposing a disproportionate 
impact on either the poor or the wealthy. This requires taxing labor 
income and capital income at one equal, “flat” rate. 
Epstein’s puzzling assertion that the state may vary tax rules by asset 
type is an even greater deviation from the severe constraints imposed 
by a natural property rights reading of the Takings Clause — and 
creates no end of possible manipulations that would result in 
disproportionate impact. Epstein’s claim that “the gains and losses of 
these tax rules are so heavily diversified throughout society that it 
seems pointless to challenge them under any disproportionate impact 
test”81 is simply untrue. Essentially the only form of wealth held by 
most lower- and middle-class families is their home.82 Stocks, bonds, 
and other financial assets are owned extremely disproportionately by 
the wealthy. Thus, providing more generous tax treatment for 
financial assets than for homes inevitably introduces a regressive 
disproportionate impact into the tax code. 
The fact that Epstein felt compelled to carve out these exceptions to 
the universality and uniformity requirements of natural property 
rights seems to be an implicit recognition that applying his 
interpretation of the Takings Clause to taxation is simply too 
constraining. His attempt to insert even these modest bows to 
practicality, however, is inconsistent with the natural rights theory of 
the Takings Clause. There is no escaping the taxation straitjacket 
imposed by this theory. 
Finally, barring all income taxes save the flat tax prevents 
policymakers from using innovative and appealing ideas from the 
modern optimal tax literature. In work that earned him a share of the 
Nobel Prize in Economics,83 James Mirrlees demonstrated that for a 
 
https://eml.berkeley.edu//~saez/course/Kennickell(2009).pdf (showing Gini index, 
used to measure inequality, was 0.5745 for income and 0.8120 for wealth in the 
United States). 
 81 EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 301. 
 82 See Edward N. Wolff, Recent Trends in Household Wealth in the United States: 
Rising Debt and the Middle-Class Squeeze — An Update to 2007, at 17-18 (Levy Econs. 
Inst., Working Papers Series, Paper No. 589, 2010). 
 83 See The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 
1996, NOBELPRIZE.ORG, http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/ 
laureates/1996 (last visited Feb. 15, 2018). 
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society interested in balancing efficiency (in the form of incentives to 
work) and equity (as measured by the extent of income inequality), a 
particular type of progressive income taxation best achieves these twin 
goals.84 This is a very strong result in favor of progressive taxation. If, 
as seems likely, a large number of Americans give weight to both 
efficiency and fairness in setting tax policy, they should find Mirrlees’ 
optimal income tax very attractive. Natural property rights theories of 
the Takings Clause, however, take this attractive option off the table. 
E. Debtor Relief and a Surprising Straitjacket for Monetary Policy 
The straitjacket problem of natural property rights theories is by no 
means confined to taxation. This subpart traces the straightforward 
but nonetheless surprising argument that the natural rights per se rule 
against any form of debtor relief puts the monetary authorities into a 
straitjacket even more binding than that imposed on tax policy. 
Natural rights scholarship does not expressly discuss monetary 
policy, but a relationship arises implicitly based on the school’s 
discussion of debtor relief laws.85 Epstein again makes the natural 
rights argument in greatest detail. Starting from the (natural property 
rights) proposition that the right to alienate is absolute,86 he expands 
on the theme and asserts that all contract rights are property rights 
protected by the Takings Clause. Debtor relief legislation modifies 
debt contracts in favor of borrowers and therefore amounts to a taking 
of creditors’ property. Specifically, Epstein contends that shortening 
the statute of limitations for collecting a debt, statutory reductions in 
interest rates, statutory delay in collection of a debt, and even 
imposing a new burden of proof are all takings of property because 
they reduce the consideration that creditors receive under their 
contracts with debtors.87 Although the case is dated and the current 
Court might not follow it, Epstein echoes the sentiments of the 
 
 84 See J.A. Mirrlees, An Exploration in the Theory of Optimal Income Taxation, 38 
REV. ECON. STUD. 175, 207-08 (1971). Mirrlees’ result actually had a basic rate 
structure that is flat or even declining, but included a large fixed “demogrant” 
guaranteeing a minimum income. In calculating how effective tax rates vary with 
income, the demogrant dominates the relatively flat rate structure and produces 
progressivity. 
 85 For an early discussion of property rights in contractual terms, see WILLIAM B. 
STOEBUCK, NONTRESPASSORY TAKINGS IN EMINENT DOMAIN 132-33 (1977). 
 86 See EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 74 (“The right of disposition is a property, in the 
same degree and manner as the right of exclusive possession.”). 
 87 See id. at 89. 
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conservative Supreme Court that struck down debtor relief measures 
during the early stages of the Great Depression.88 
As any college student who takes Macroeconomics 101 knows, one 
of the most powerful tools for debtor relief is monetary policy. If the 
monetary authority (the Federal Reserve in the United States) pursues 
an expansionary policy that causes prices to rise, then debtors who 
borrow “old” dollars at the execution of a loan are able to repay 
creditors with “new” dollars that are worth less — potentially 
considerably less.89 
To give but one example, consider someone who borrowed $1 
million for thirty years in 1960, when inflation was running at about 
1.4%.90 Like most bonds, assume that the debtor pays periodic interest 
for the term of the loan and repays all principal at the end of the term. 
If the parties made the quite natural and common assumption that 
current inflation was the best predictor of future inflation, their 
borrowing agreement would factor in the expectation that principal 
repaid in thirty years would be made with dollars worth about 25% 
less. In actuality, given the higher inflation rates experienced for much 
of the 1970s, 1980s, and even 1990s, the lender would be repaid with 
dollars worth about 78% less. That is a difference of a little over 50%.91 
This real-world example shows just how potent inflation can be in 
transferring wealth from creditors to debtors. As the numbers in the 
previous paragraph illustrate, debtors who borrowed in 1960 for a 30-
year term had the real burden of repaying principal in 1990 cut in half. 
That is some serious debt relief. Unless natural rights theorists are 
going to elevate form over substance, inflation must be every bit as 
much of a taking as the other debtor relief legislation they cite. 
There is an important caveat: it is only unexpected inflation that is a 
taking. In the example above, we made the natural assumption that 
parties would factor current inflation levels into their loan agreement. 
If inflation had continued at about 1% for the entire 30-year period, 
then we have assumed that the terms of the loan would have been 
 
 88 See Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 602 (1935) 
(holding debt repayment extensions, reducing principal owed to appraised value of 
property, and other measures constituted a taking of creditor property without due 
process). Radford has never been overruled or even questioned by the Court. 
 89 See, e.g., RUDIGER DORNBUSCH ET AL., MACROECONOMICS 169-70 (11th ed. 2011) 
(describing how inflation erodes the value of assets yielding fixed returns). 
 90 Top Picks, BUREAU LAB. STAT., https://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/surveymost?bls (last 
visited Feb. 15, 2018). 
 91 Of course, this is just the loan principal; the value of the lender’s periodic 
interest payments are also eroded, and the size of this erosion increases during periods 
of continual inflation, as the United States experienced from 1960 to 1990. 
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such that the lender received exactly what she expected, in real terms, 
when principal was repaid in 1990. Thus, if the Federal Reserve both 
announced inflation targets in advance and met those targets precisely, 
inflation would surprise no one, targets would be factored into the 
terms of loan agreements, and creditors would have no takings claims. 
That, however, is unrealistic. The Federal Reserve does announce 
inflation targets, though only for a few years out and not for anything 
like thirty years.92 Hitting even short-term targets, however, is quite 
another matter. Macroeconomics is far more social than science — it 
enjoys little of the precision found in physics or chemistry. In 
particular, the Federal Reserve has frequently failed to hit its inflation 
targets.93 The world is simply too complicated. Unforeseeable shocks, 
from financial meltdowns to oil embargoes to the changing fortunes of 
large economies (e.g., China on the upside, Greece on the downside), 
to name just three, constantly confront monetary policymakers. They 
must either adjust their policies to meet old targets under new 
conditions or may need to take the more serious step of changing 
those targets to deal with all of those surprises. 
Thus, unexpected bouts of inflation are inevitable. Or, to be more 
accurate, inflation will be above targeted levels with some frequency. 
Of course, it will also be below target with some frequency.94 In that 
case, it is creditors instead of debtors who will reap a benefit, as they 
will receive repayment in dollars that are worth more than the dollars 
they originally loaned out. The opposing pair of inflation and deflation 
both impose disproportionate burdens in precisely the same fashion as 
progressive and regressive taxation: progressive taxation and inflation 
burden the wealthy; regressive taxation and deflation burden the poor. 
Epstein argues that progressive taxation and debtor relief (like 
inflation) are unconstitutional takings from the wealthy, with hardly 
 
 92 See Open Market Operations, BOARD GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS., 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/openmarket.htm (last updated Dec. 
13, 2017) (showing that the Federal Reserve generally changes interest rate targets 
more than once a year, and since 2005 has never left a single target in place for longer 
than seven years — an unprecedented target of essentially 0% adopted as part of the 
response to the onset of the Great Recession). 
 93 See generally Daniel L. Thornton, Monetary Policy: Why Money Matters and 
Interest Rates Don’t (Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Working Paper 2012-020A, Oct. 
2012), https://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2012/2012-020.pdf (arguing that “by 
aggressively pursuing countercyclical stabilization policymakers run a significant risk 
of missing on their inflation objective”). 
 94 It is natural to assume that the Federal Reserve makes unbiased errors in hitting 
its inflation targets. If it made biased errors (e.g., on average it came in 2% above its 
targets), economic actors would simply add 2% to any target announced by the Fed 
and draft contracts accordingly. 
  
1380 University of California, Davis [Vol. 51:1351 
any discussion of the symmetric cases that harm the less affluent 
majority of society. A primary purpose of this Article is to highlight 
the fact that natural property rights theory, taken to its logical 
conclusion, finds symmetric takings from the less affluent in the cases 
of regressive taxation and deflationary monetary policy. 
If unexpectedly high and unexpectedly low inflation/deflation are 
both takings (the former from creditors, the latter from debtors), the 
Federal Reserve is in a by-now familiar policy straitjacket, though 
likely even worse than that constricting tax policy. At least there is one 
tax that conforms to Epstein’s read of the Takings Clause that can be 
set and maintained without any risk of error: the flat tax. Given the 
practical impossibilities of hitting inflation targets, the Fed will face a 
continual stream of takings claims — from creditors when it comes in 
above target and from debtors when it comes in below target. This is 
really far worse than a straitjacket. A natural rights interpretation of 
the Takings Clause makes it impossible to conduct monetary policy in 
a large modern economy without provoking hundreds of thousands if 
not millions of just compensation claims every year from either 
creditors or debtors. It is difficult to justify such a result under any 
acceptable theory of constitutional interpretation. 
Natural rights advocates might issue this seemingly powerful reply 
to this argument. They could note that monetary policy involves 
substantial risk given the Fed’s chronic inability to hit its inflation 
targets. Loan contracts then should be read, the argument continues, 
to allocate the risk inherent in the conduct of monetary policy. 
Creditors who do not bargain for protection from unexpectedly high 
inflation have only themselves to blame, and symmetrically so for 
debtors who do not bargain for protection against unexpectedly low 
inflation. Thus, the argument would run, the risks of monetary policy 
surprises are for private parties to allocate as they see fit in their 
contracts. There simply is no taking. 
This argument, however, would prove far too much for natural 
property rights theories. Indeed, it would unravel the entire project. 
Start with the more targeted debtor relief measures expressly deemed 
takings (e.g., lengthening debtors’ time to repay, or reducing interest 
rates).95 Creditors who wanted to guard against such legislation could 
include clauses in loan agreements either opting out of the new rule if 
permitted or requiring additional consideration if not. This method of 
rejecting any unfavorable legal innovation during the performance of a 
contract works in any domain in which natural property rights 
 
 95 See supra text accompanying notes 86–87. 
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theorists argue that governmental action has taken the contract/
property rights of one side. For example, Epstein’s extended argument 
that Workers’ Compensation statutes might amount to a taking, 
depending on their details, crumbles entirely in the face of this 
stratagem.96 
Indeed, taken to its logical conclusion, this argument implies that 
compensation need not be paid even in the paradigmatic case of the 
government taking title to property for construction of a road. If 
monetary policy — one type of governmental policy — is a risk for 
private parties to manage, why would we treat land acquisition policy 
any differently? Property owners worried about the taking of their real 
estate could simply buy insurance that would fully compensate them if 
and when the government expropriated their land. This of course is a 
reduction ad absurdum, at least for natural property rights advocates, 
as they clearly wish to expand, not contract, the government’s duties 
to pay just compensation to property owners whose property falls in 
value due to any governmental action. 
Before leaving this topic, it is important to stress the magnitude of 
the stakes. Monetary policy is one of the most important levers that 
the government has to control employment, incomes, growth, and 
inflation (or deflation).97 The success or failure of such 
macroeconomic policies has enormous impact on all citizens. Prudent 
monetary policy fosters sustained economic growth, robust labor 
markets, and manageable levels of price change.98 Imprudent 
monetary policy can induce recessions costing millions their jobs, and 
inflations or deflation with their attendant harms to creditors or 
debtors.99 Natural property rights theory robs The Federal Reserve 
Board of degrees of freedom necessary to do its part in keeping the 
economy on track. 
F. Barring (Pareto) Efficient Redistribution 
There is yet a third policy dimension in which natural property 
rights theory straitjackets state action and renders unconstitutional 
programs that are of value to virtually everyone. In The Spirit Level, 
Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett present evidence suggesting that 
inequality imposes society-wide costs — including significant costs on 
 
 96 EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 252-53. 
 97 See DORNBUSCH ET AL., supra note 89, at 249-52. 
 98 See id. at 271-77. 
 99 Id. 
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the wealthy.100 It seems, for example, that after controlling for other 
factors, everyone, rich and poor alike, fair better in terms of many 
health outcomes in countries with lower inequality.101 Perhaps less 
surprisingly, violence is less prevalent in societies with less 
inequality.102 They suggest that one of the key causal mechanisms is 
stress: in highly unequal societies, the poor feel entirely marginalized 
while the wealthy live in constant fear of crime and experience 
frequent resentment from the less fortunate. In more equal societies, 
the authors posit, few citizens feel left out of the economy’s bounty, 
and the wealthy do in fact face less crime and likely less resentment as 
well.103 
What, one might ask, does this have to do with taxation and 
takings? In a word, everything. If the suggestive findings in The Spirit 
Level are confirmed with stronger empirical evidence,104 there is a new 
and very powerful reason to redistribute income and wealth: 
inequality really does make everyone worse off. There is no need to 
rely on human empathy or the desire to maintain social peace. If The 
Spirit Level analysis is correct, redistribution of wealth would benefit 
both rich and poor in general, meaning that it comes very close to 
meeting the extremely demanding standard of Pareto efficiency.105 Yet, 
under a natural rights regime, redistribution violates the Takings 
Clause on a priori grounds impervious to any such empirically 
validated novel phenomenon. Yet again, a natural property rights 
reading of the Takings Clause summarily bans policies of potentially 
enormous social utility. That has to be a major reason to question the 
validity of the natural rights approach. 
 
 100 See WILKINSON & PICKETT, supra note 12. 
 101 See id. at 63-72 (chapter 5, “Mental health and drug use”); id. at 73-87 (chapter 
6, “Physical health and life expectancy”); id. at 89-102 (chapter 7, “Obesity: wider 
income gaps, wider waists”).  
 102 See id. at 129-44 (chapter 10, “Violence: gaining respect”). 
 103 See id. at 33-45. 
 104 There is some scholarship suggesting that the data on health outcomes, 
properly analyzed, does not support the thesis of The Spirit Level. See, e.g., Angus 
Deaton, Health, Inequality, and Economic Development, 41 J. ECON. LIT. 113, 115 
(2003). 
 105 Recall that a Pareto-Efficient policy harms no one’s welfare and increases the 
welfare of at least one person. See supra text accompanying note 25. 
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II. FAILINGS OF THE NATURAL PROPERTY RIGHTS CASE AGAINST 
REDISTRIBUTION 
A. Public Goods in General and Charity in Particular 
None of the arguments made in Part II identify any flaws in the 
internal logic of natural property rights theory. Its conclusions follow 
from its premises. Thus, the only escape from the straitjackets that it 
imposes on taxation, redistribution, and monetary policy is to 
undermine those foundational assumptions. That is the purpose of the 
remainder of this Article. Later subparts will (i) call into question 
choice of the proper tax base, (ii) offer alternative reasonable ways to 
regulate taxation constitutionally, and (iii) point out that the natural 
property rights social welfare criterion (which I dub “super-Pareto 
efficiency”) could not be less feasible. 
This subpart begins the critique of natural property rights 
assumptions by raising two fundamental questions about its treatment 
of public goods. First, it rejects the presumption that public goods 
provide benefits in roughly direct proportion to income. It then 
focuses on the particularly important case of one public good in 
particular: charity. Because Richard Epstein has constructed the most 
comprehensive and cohesive natural property rights case for barring 
progressive taxation, and because his work remains by far the most 
influential articulation of natural property rights, the critique in this 
subpart focuses largely on his assumptions. 
1. How Are the Benefits of Public Goods Distributed Across 
Income Levels? 
At the core of Epstein’s case against the progressive income tax as a 
taking is his assertion that public goods benefit taxpayers in direct 
proportion to their income.106 To put this in concrete terms, if a road 
delivers $100 of value to someone earning $10,000 (a 1% “yield”), 
Epstein assumes that it benefits someone earning $100,000 to the tune 
of $1,000 (same said 1% “yield”). He of course does not argue that this 
holds precisely. He does, however, contend that it is the most natural 
and realistic assumption to make about the manner in which the 
benefits of public goods vary with income. Combined with his rule 
against disproportionate impacts, this directly implies that a flat tax 
and only a flat tax satisfies the Takings Clause by keeping amounts 
 
 106 See supra text accompanying notes 46–48. 
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taken via taxation in rough equivalence with benefits received from 
the expenditure of those tax dollars on public goods. 
As discussed earlier,107 however, Epstein presents no data to support 
this foundational assumption, and his theoretical justifications are 
exceedingly flimsy (e.g., benefits in proportion to income seems the 
“most natural” assumption to make). No other natural rights theorist 
has stepped in to fill this gap. 
Although no hard data appears to exist, there are contrary 
theoretical grounds to believe that the benefits emanating from public 
goods increase disproportionately as income (and wealth) increase. 
First and foremost, a large share of federal and state dollars (for 
example, police, courts, the patent office, recording systems, etc.) is 
spent to protect property. The expenditures are of immense value to 
those with lots of property needing protection, but they are of 
essentially no value to those in the bottom quintile of the population 
who have essentially no wealth at all. In addition, small property 
owners (e.g., someone who owns only a home) can in many ways 
protect their property with little state assistance, but someone with a 
large fortune in multiple forms (real estate in many states; patents; 
stocks; bonds; etc.) has not a prayer of protecting their property on 
their own. There are economies of scale in the provision of the law 
and order that keeps property safe, and the wealthy capture the lion’s 
share of this value created by tax dollars because of the extreme 
inequality of wealth holdings.108 
Second, those same dollars also go to protecting citizens from 
physical harm. At one extreme, one might believe that this is of 
roughly equal value to all citizens. Under Epstein’s theory, this would 
call for a “head tax,” (i.e., a levy that collected the exact same dollar 
amount from each citizen) independent of income. Epstein suggests 
that a head tax would be a taking from the poor,109 but this again 
depends critically on his assumption that the benefits of public 
services vary directly with income. At the other extreme, however, 
protecting people may yield benefits that rise sharply with income, as 
the previous section suggested was the case for property. Due to their 
greater public influence, the wealthy appear able to divert 
disproportionate police protection to the neighborhoods that they 
inhabit.110 This is one of the reasons that wealthy neighborhoods are 
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Equity, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1662, 1675 (1979). 
  
2018] The Natural Property Rights Straitjacket 1385 
much safer than nearby poorer neighborhoods. These hidden politics 
of police protection may insure that wealthy neighborhoods always 
enjoy disproportionate police protection.111 The wealthy should pay 
taxes on a progressive schedule if they are indeed able to capture more 
than their share of public safety services. 
To take a very different example, consider the distribution of 
benefits from national policies to promote international trade like 
NAFTA112 or the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (“TPP”).113 
Although these trade agreements certainly benefit all citizens by 
facilitating cheaper goods, they also give rise to real costs — and those 
costs are not distributed evenly across the income distribution. One of 
the primary effects of trade is to reduce domestic employment in 
labor-intensive industries.114 Foreign competition has decimated a 
number of large U.S industries since World War II, including, among 
others, textiles, steelmaking, and appliance manufacturing.115 
Although some domestic capital owners have suffered, many have 
simply moved production overseas and enjoyed higher profits. When 
capital benefits at the expense of labor, the wealthy benefit 
disproportionately and the poor suffer disproportionately. Thus, 
government resources spent to increase international trade yield 
disproportionate benefits to the wealthy. 
As mentioned previously, in order to assess the distribution of 
benefits from governmental expenditures, we must sum the benefits 
 
 111 See Naomi Martin, Questions of Fairness Arise as Wealthy Pay for Extra Patrols, 
WASH. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/oct/26/ 
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 112 North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 
I.L.M. 289 (1993), http:// www.worldtradelaw.net/fta/agreements/nafta.pdf. 
 113 The Trans-Pacific Partnership, Feb. 4, 2016, https://ustr.gov/trade-
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 114 See John McLaren & Shushanik Hakobyan, Looking for Local Labor Market 
Effects of NAFTA 4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16535, 2010) 
(finding that NAFTA dramatically lowered wage increases for workers in industries 
most subject to competition from unskilled labor in Mexico). 
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from each of these examples (law and order; trade policy) along with a 
long list of other services funded with tax dollars. Nobody knows the 
true distribution of benefits across income levels, but the examples 
given above suggest that, contra Epstein, there are good reasons to 
believe that public goods disproportionately benefit the wealthy. If so, 
Epstein’s conclusions about progressive taxation must do a full 180 
degree turn: progressive taxation becomes not just permissible, but 
mandated under natural rights postulates as the only way to restore 
proportionality between taxes paid and benefits received from the use 
of those tax dollars. 
2. Charity Is a Public Good — No Different from Others 
Charity, in the form of welfare payments, merits special attention. 
Such expenditures share a core redistributory purpose with progressive 
taxation. Natural rights theories of course condemn redistribution as it 
by definition does not match tax bills with the benefits from public 
projects as closely as possible. Instead, it takes from A and gives to B. 
From a natural rights perspective, this is an Ur-taking. 
The problem is that charity is a classic economic public good.116 
Whether motivated by innate empathy, desires to provide insurance 
against hard times, or majoritarian decisions to “buy social peace” by 
mollifying the poor, government-conducted redistribution solves a 
collective action problem with what amounts to mandated charity. 
Those who voluntarily give to charity (for whatever reason) cannot 
exclude non-contributing fellow citizens from the benefits of charity 
— be it a satisfied sense of empathy for relieving those in the most 
abject poverty or, alternatively, less social unrest. In addition, gifts to 
charity are non-rivalrous: benefits (be it empathy or social peace) 
accruing to one wealthier taxpayer in no way diminish benefits to 
another. These are the two attributes characteristic of public goods 
and, like police services or national defense, private markets will 
provide suboptimal levels of charity and possibly none at all.117 
Epstein initially suggests that welfare (i.e., publicly-organized 
charity) paid for with tax dollars, is not a public good, declaring that 
“there is no classic public good like defense that necessarily requires a 
 
 116 James Andreoni, Philanthropy, in 2 HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF GIVING, 
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collective choice” to assist the needy.118 As he must, given the copious 
literature to the contrary,119 Epstein eventually does concede that 
charity is a public good. This concession, however, is stinting. Instead 
of acknowledging alternative possibilities, he suggests that public 
welfare programs are “little more than a strategic bribe that spares the 
payers the greater cost of police enforcement and control.”120 
Epstein further claims that there is no real need for welfare in the 
United States as it is the land of opportunity — such that anyone 
willing to work hard and save to invest can move out of the ranks of 
poverty.121 This was a more defensible claim when he wrote Takings in 
1985, but no more. A large and sophisticated empirical literature has 
shown that America has gone from being one of the most 
socioeconomically mobile developed nations to one of the least 
mobile.122 
Ignoring this (very important) issue, it is far from clear that using 
redistribution to insure domestic peace would be unconstitutional. 
The government certainly has the power to use money instead of force 
to resolve international disputes. Why would the Takings Clause 
prohibit domestic analogs of such tactics? When candidates in favor of 
foreign aid win elections, opponents of such policies will be 
(involuntarily) taxed to implement the very policy that they abhor. 
Shifting the context from foreign to domestic makes no material 
difference. Natural property rights supporters might note a material 
difference: when the state uses money to buy domestic peace, the poor 
receiving welfare vote to benefit themselves. This, however, is only a 
question of degree. It is conceivable that a majority of the middle and 
upper classes who bear the cost of redistributive policies might find 
welfare the best tool for tamping down social unrest. 
All of this presumes that welfare actually is a bribe to maintain 
domestic tranquility. This casts such public programs in the worst 
possible light, implying that the less fortunate are a rabble constantly 
 
 118 EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 315. 
 119 Andreoni, supra note 116, at 1204. 
 120 EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 316. 
 121 See id. at 316. 
 122 See Raj Chetty et al., The Fading American Dream: Trends in Absolute Income 
Mobility Since 1940, SCIENCE, Apr. 24, 2017, at 8-9 [hereinafter The Fading American 
Dream]; Miles Corak, Inequality from Generation to Generation: The United States in 
Comparison 2 (Univ. of Ottawa, Discussion Paper No. 9929, 2016). See also Raj Chetty 
et al., Is the United States Still a Land of Opportunity? Recent Trends in Intergenerational 
Mobility, 104 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 141, 146 (2014) [hereinafter Recent 
Trends] (noting that several regions in the United States persistently offer less mobility 
than other developed nations). 
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threatening to pillage if they do not receive adequate ransom from the 
propertied class. There is a compelling alternative: innate human 
empathy for the misfortunes of others. There is a large and growing 
literature demonstrating the important role that empathy plays in 
social relations.123 Such empathy may motivate a majority of the 
population to favor progressive taxation and transfer programs that 
assist less fortunate citizens. 
It is no answer to say, as Epstein does,124 that empathetic individuals 
are more than welcome to contribute privately, on their own. This 
misses the obvious and critical combination of the facts that 
(i) people’s empathy is not boundless and, moreover, (ii) charity is a 
public good. Empathy is but one component of people’s preferences, 
and it competes with more selfish desires. Those who donate to 
private charity when their peers with equal or, even worse, greater 
means decline to do so cannot help but feel that these others have 
taken advantage of them. If most people do have an innate sense of 
empathy, then what we have is a classic free-rider problem. Potential 
contributors to private charity may balk at the prospect of giving their 
fair share only to see those of equal or greater means free-ride on such 
contributions without making their own donations. Free-riding, of 
course, is one of the central problems with private provision of public 
goods125 and explains why we do not observe significant privately-
financed police departments or privately-funded armies. These are 
public goods for which coerced payments (i.e., taxes) must be levied. 
Charity is no different.126 
Given his recognition that charity/welfare is a public good, it is 
puzzling that Epstein does not make this connection. It is even more 
puzzling that he deploys private law doctrines to claim that 
government welfare programs are takings. Reminding readers that the 
government’s powers are simply the sum of ceded private rights and 
 
 123 See, e.g., C. Daniel Batson et al., Empathy and Altruism, in HANDBOOK OF POSITIVE 
PSYCHOLOGY 485, 485-98 (C. R. Snyder & Shane J. Lopez eds., 2002). 
 124 See EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 317 (“The refusal of any single individual to 
provide welfare payments does not prevent others from going ahead with their 
plans.”). 
 125 Free-rider Problem, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free-rider_problem 
(last visited Mar. 13, 2018) (“In economics, the free-rider problem occurs when those 
who benefit from resources, goods, or services do not pay for them, which results in 
an underprovision of those goods or services.”). 
 126 Cf. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 323 (arguing that the charitable deduction on 
federal income tax returns is a violation of the Takings Clause, as it permits those 
making charitable deductions to implicitly shift some of the cost of their contributions 
onto fellow taxpayers). 
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causes of action, he declares that “[t]here is quite simply no private 
cause of action for want of benevolence that remotely resembles those 
causes allowable under the dominant actions of tort, contract, and 
restitution.”127 
All true, but entirely irrelevant. There is no private cause of action 
analogous to the state’s power to extract taxes to support the police or 
the military. As Epstein himself emphasizes, government’s coercive 
powers are necessary to provide such public goods. He offers no 
reason, however, for why we should take a different perspective on the 
particular public good called charity. If a majority can force everyone 
to pay for police services, Epstein has no principled grounds on which 
to argue that a majority cannot force everyone to pay for welfare 
programs. 
Epstein similarly appeals to the foundational American tort law rule 
that a person has no duty to rescue another, regardless of how easy 
rescue might be, if the person has no legal duty to the imperiled other 
party.128 “The legal theory that recognizes no obligation to rescue a 
stranger in imminent peril cannot generate, let alone nourish, a system 
of transfer payments and welfare obligations.”129 Yet again, Epstein 
fails to acknowledge the difference made by the fact that welfare is a 
public good. A majority can force all American taxpayers to pay for a 
war to liberate oppressed people abroad. Does it make any sense to say 
that the Takings Clause prevents the same majority from forcing 
everyone to help impoverished domestic citizens? 
To round out the discussion of welfare, we turn to a couple of 
empirical issues. First, Epstein asserts that private actors are better at 
delivering charity because they can better police the moral hazard 
problem — the fact the existence of charity may encourage sloth and 
thus the demand for charity.130 He provides no support for this 
empirical assertion, and I was unable to unearth any in my own 
research. Moreover, there are at least a few data points to the contrary. 
In particular, there is actually evidence that medical care benefits are 
 
 127 Id. at 318. 
 128 For representative cases, see for example Hurley v. Eddingfield, 59 N.E. 1058 
(Ind. 1901); Osterlind v. Hill, 160 N.E. 301 (Mass. 1928); Harper v. Herman, 499 
N.W.2d 472 (Minn. 1993); Yania v. Bigan, 155 A.2d 343 (Pa. 1959). For the black 
letter statement of the no-duty-to-rescue rule, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 314 (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“The fact that the actor realizes or should realize that 
action on his part is necessary for another’s aid or protection does not of itself impose 
upon him a duty to take such action.”). 
 129 EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 319. 
 130 See Mancur Olson, A Less Ideological Way of Deciding How Much Should Be 
Given to the Poor, 112 DAEDALUS 217, 234 (1983).  
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delivered more efficiently by the government than by private actors.131 
Indeed, fundamental economic theory predicts that the government 
will be superior to the market in delivering public goods.132 
B. Is There One “Right” Tax Base? 
The previous subpart focused largely on expenditure issues — the 
extent to which government outlays benefited rich and poor citizens 
asymmetrically. This subpart explores the other side of the ledger, the 
source of government revenues. When Epstein discusses tax revenue, 
he focuses overwhelmingly on rates. This subpart argues that his 
stinted discussion of tax base issues is unjustified and that there is no 
one “right” tax base. Indeed, there are strong arguments that a wealth 
tax has a better fit with the logic of natural property rights theories 
than an income tax. The prospect of a wealth tax presents natural 
rights theories with a serious problem: a flat wealth tax likely 
approximates a progressive income tax given the fact that wealth is 
distributed much more unevenly than income. Can natural property 
right’s aversion to progressive taxation be defeated by the simple 
expedient of adopting a tax base that actually offers a better fit with 
the paradigm’s basic logic? If so, the case against progressive income 
taxation is a matter of superficial form, not substantive bite. 
1. The Dubious Presumption in Favor of an Income Tax 
Epstein devotes remarkably little attention to the choice of a tax 
base. He seems to believe that the modern state can fund itself only 
with “general revenue” taxes and seems to use this phrase to mean 
only income and consumption taxes.133 Although he explicitly states 
that the Takings Clause permits a consumption tax instead of an 
income tax,134 he generally focuses on the latter. 
His seeming indifference between income and consumption taxation 
is puzzling, as they have substantially different effects across the 
 
 131 For a good review of the literature, see Lisa Clemans-Cope et al., Medicaid 
Spending Growth Compared to Other Payers: A Look at the Evidence, HENRY J. KAISER 
FAM. FOUND. at 10-13 (Apr. 13, 2016), http://kff.org/report-section/medicaid-
spending-growth-compared-to-other-payers-issue-brief. 
 132 See RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC 
GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS 143 (2d ed. 1996) (discussing the “tendency for [market] 
equilibrium to result in the provision of an amount of the public good that falls short 
of its Pareto-efficient level”). 
 133 See EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 297-301. 
 134 See id. at 294. 
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wealth distribution. The difference between the two is simple. An 
income tax is a levy on both consumption and savings — all income is 
used in one of these two ways. A consumption tax, of course, taxes 
only consumption and leaves savings undiminished. If the savings rate 
was constant across incomes, then both taxes would have the same 
substantive impact on tax rates. Of course, that is not the case; the 
savings rate rises sharply at higher income levels.135 
The positive relationship between income and savings rates means 
that a consumption tax — usually implemented in the form of a sales 
tax — is much more regressive than an income tax. The consumption 
tax leaves savings untaxed, and only the wealthy save significant 
shares of their income.136 Epstein’s argument implies that there is only 
one “right” way to tax in compliance with the Takings Clause, but 
then blesses two taxes that impose markedly different burdens across 
the income distribution. Further, he offers no explanation for why it is 
acceptable to tax either income (consumption + savings) or 
consumption alone, but not acceptable to tax just savings. A tax on 
only savings would be extraordinarily progressive, yet Epstein 
provides no explanation of why such a tax would violate the Takings 
Clause — which presumably it must, because a savings tax would be 
even more progressive than an income tax which natural rights theory 
deems excessively progressive. 
2. The Long List of Potential Tax Bases 
The problem is actually much larger, as the universe of possible tax 
bases extends far beyond income and consumption. Here is a list, by 
no means complete, of the tax bases that governments might use: 
(i) Incomes 
(ii) Consumption (sales tax) 
(iii) Savings 
(iv) Individuals (head tax) 
(v) Tariffs 
(vi) Wealth (general property) 
(vii) Inheritances/Estate 
 
 135 See Dynan et al., supra note 55, at 399-400. 
 136 See PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, THE PRECARIOUS STATE OF FAMILY BALANCE SHEETS 
11-13 (2015). 
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We have already seen that Epstein (i) would permit both income and 
consumption taxes despite the very different burdens that they would 
impose on different incomes, and (ii) gives no reason for embracing 
either of these taxes but implicitly seems to reject a tax on savings. 
Epstein does consider the possibility of using the individual person 
as the tax base, meaning that each person would pay the same amount 
in taxes regardless of income, savings, or wealth. Such a “head tax” or 
“capitation” of course would be extraordinarily regressive. A poor 
person paying the same dollar tax as a wealthy person would face a 
much higher effective percent tax rate. Epstein properly realizes this 
and deems a head tax an “illicit redistribution to the rich.”137 It is far 
from clear, however, that a head tax is inconsistent with natural 
property rights axioms. The key issue, as discussed earlier, is the 
extent to which the benefits from government services such as the 
police, the courts, and the military vary with income.138 It is not 
logically impossible that the benefits of government services are the 
same to everyone, regardless of income or wealth, in which case 
Epstein’s assumptions would force him to embrace the head tax — 
despite the fact that the poor almost certainly could not afford to pay 
their equal share of total public revenue needs. This is yet another 
illustration of the sort of straitjacket that natural rights interpretations 
of the Takings Clause impose on tax policy. 
To the extent that original intent matters, funding the government 
largely with tariffs on imported goods must pass constitutional muster 
as that is indeed the manner in which the federal government met 
most of its revenue needs until the twentieth century.139 Though 
formally paid by consumers, the true burden (“incidence”) of such 
taxes is complicated.140 Figuring out the incidence of a tax — who 
actually pays the tax — can be complex. To take only the most 
prominent issue, tariffs are usually enacted to protect domestic 
manufacturers from foreign competition. If, however, even a relatively 
high tariff is insufficient to make domestic goods competitive, the 
tariff harms consumers but does not help producers. At the other 
 
 137 EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 297. 
 138 See supra pp. 33-34. 
 139 Tariffs made up over 90% of revenues throughout the first decades of the American 
Founding Era and, with the exception of the Civil War, tariffs comprised over half of 
federal revenue until the twentieth century. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS 
OF THE UNITED STATES 1789-1945, at 243-45 (1949), https://www2.census.gov/ 
prod2/statcomp/documents/HistoricalStatisticsoftheUnitedStates1789-1945.pdf. 
 140 See ROBERT M. DUNN, JR. & JOHN H. MUTTI, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 138-48 
(6th ed. 2004). 
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extreme, if domestically produced goods are only slightly more costly 
than imports, a tariff imposes minimal costs on consumers.141 
Questions about incidence (true burden) make analyzing all of the 
taxes on the list above more complex; for the purposes of this Article 
we abstract from these concerns. 
3. The Strong Case for a Wealth (General Property) Tax — Under 
Natural Property Rights Assumptions 
Perhaps Epstein’s most glaring omission from the taxes listed in the 
previous section is the wealth, or general property tax.142 If we think 
about what the state protects with police, courts, and other essential 
public services, it looks a lot more like it is protecting property than 
income. Of course, law and order enables a modern economy to 
function and is essential to enabling the division of labor and the 
higher incomes generated from such economic activity. Still, the police 
devote a considerable share of their resources to protecting business 
premises, houses, and the contents of both. These of course are 
property interests. The government provides significant services to 
protect intellectual property rights like patents, copyrights, and 
trademarks.143 It also provides significant protection for owners of 
stocks, bonds, and other financial assets.144 Larger expenditure 
categories, like the military, protect both property and the ability to 
earn income. So too for state and local police forces and court systems. 
It is difficult if not impossible to calculate the magnitude of the 
benefits provided to each. Given all of these examples, it is plausible 
that the government is as much or more in the business of protecting 
property than it is in protecting the ability to earn income. If so, it 
does not seem particularly controversial to claim that property is an 
appropriate tax base. 
 
 141 See id. at 147. 
 142 I use the phrase “general property tax” to distinguish a wealth tax on all forms of 
property from the more limited common meaning of a “property tax” as a tax on only 
real estate. A general property (wealth) tax would reach not just realty but all forms of 
personal property as well: bank accounts, bonds, stocks, patents, copyrights, etc. 
 143 In fiscal year 2016, running the U.S. Patent and Trademark office cost about 
$3.5 billion. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, FISCAL YEAR 2016 PRESIDENT’S 
BUDGET: THE USPTO CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION 11 (2015), 
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/fy16pbr.pdf. 
 144 The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) cost about $250 
million. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, PRESIDENT’S BUDGET: FISCAL YEAR 2017, 
at 11 (2016). In fiscal year 2016, running the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”) cost about $1.6 billion. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FY 2017 CONGRESSIONAL 
BUDGET JUSTIFICATION 15 (2016). 
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To put the matter in sharp relief, consider a citizen who lives 
exclusively off of income produced by property — for example, 
assume that X owns a building worth $1 million that generates 
$50,000 a year in net income. Though X of course needs the 
government to protect his right to collect this year’s rents, she has a 
much larger interest in governmental protection of her “permanent” 
property interest in the building. Losing this year’s income or a 
fraction of it would of course be painful, but losing part or all of her 
property (wealth) interest will affect income not just this year but for 
all subsequent years (out to infinity given her right to make a 
bequest). 
More generally, when we think of an individual’s share in a venture, 
we tend to think in terms of stock, not dividends. Indeed, the term 
stock comes from something fixed like wealth, not from a flow like 
income. Stocks in companies that pay no dividends still represent 
wealth. Any business net income not distributed raises the value of the 
stock — an accretion to wealth.145 If we imagine society as one huge 
joint venture, then the most natural measure of a taxpayer’s share in 
this societal business is her relative wealth. Wealth and not income 
should be taxed under the natural property right theories’ prime 
directive to match the individual burdens of taxes and the individual 
benefits of public outlays as closely as possible. 
Property taxation has a long pedigree in the United States, especially 
at the state and local level.146 Although most frequently it has been 
applied to real property, there are no barriers to imposing a broader 
property tax that reaches all forms of property/wealth. The Takings 
Clause no doubt protects property, but by its very language it protects 
property from takings. It does not protect property from taxation as a 
matter of either history or doctrine. 
Wealth (property) is distributed much more unequally than 
income.147 Thus, wealth (“general property”) taxation is much more 
progressive than income taxation. It is possible, then, that a flat 
property tax would be roughly equivalent to a progressive income tax. 
As natural property rights theorists have no grounds to reject using 
property as a tax base, this possibility puts them in a rather 
uncomfortable position. If a progressive income tax is a taking, then 
 
 145 This is an application of the well-known Modigliani-Miller result. See Merton 
H. Miller & Franco Modigliani, Dividend Policy, Growth, and the Valuation of Shares, 
34 J. BUS. 411, 425-26 (1961). 
 146 See GLENN W. FISHER, THE WORST TAX? A HISTORY OF PROPERTY TAX IN AMERICA 1-
3 (1996). 
 147 See supra note 80. 
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— unless form dominates substance — so too must a flat tax on 
wealth. Given that elevating substance over form is essential to natural 
rights reading of the Takings Clause,148 arguing that a progressive 
income tax is a taking becomes simply untenable. Taxing property is 
unobjectionable, and a flat tax on property (the flat rate mandated by 
natural property rights arguments) will in substance look a lot like a 
progressive tax on income. This demonstrates the rather obvious point 
that the choice of the tax basis is critical, and different tax bases will 
have different distributional consequences. This strains the natural 
property rights case against progressive income taxation to the 
breaking point. 
Admittedly, general wealth taxation (beyond taxes on real property) 
is uncommon in America and other developed nations. In a world of 
sharply rising inequality, however, scholars are advancing wealth 
taxation as perhaps the best tool to prevent the accumulation of 
excessive dynastic wealth. Most prominently, in his widely acclaimed 
book Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Thomas Piketty argues that a 
worldwide tax on wealth is the best tool available to counterweigh the 
growing inequality of income and wealth produced by private markets 
and legal regimes subject to disproportionate influence by the 
wealthy.149 From a natural rights perspective fighting inequality is not 
a proper governmental task. As argued earlier, however,150 inequality 
may impose costs on the wealthy as well as the poor, and the 
government alone has the potential to overcome collective action 
problems in acting effectively to reduce it. 
4. The Strong Case for an Inheritance Tax 
As detrimental as growing income and wealth inequality may be to 
the social fabric of America, the decline in socioeconomic mobility is 
of even greater concern. “Equal opportunity” has been a foundational 
principle of American society from the founding of the Republic. For 
generations, America has conceived of itself as the antithesis of the 
feudalism that still permeated British society in the eighteenth century, 
where lineage determined life chances.151 In the United States, it has 
 
 148 See supra text accompanying notes 63–70. 
 149 THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 515-39 (2014) (chapter 
15, “A Global Tax on Capital”). 
 150 See supra text accompanying notes 100–03. 
 151 JACQUE LE GOFF, MEDIEVAL CIVILIZATION 400-1500, at 26 (Julia Barrow trans., 
1988) (1964) (“Medieval Christian Europe was to turn the desire to escape from one’s 
lot into a major sin. ‘Like father, like son’ was to be the rule in the western middle 
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long been maintained that even children from poorer families could 
make good with hard work and entrepreneurship.152 
Through most of the twentieth century, America remained a land of 
relatively high socioeconomic mobility.153 Since about 1980, however, 
that has changed. Some very recent findings from extraordinarily good 
data sources have confirmed what earlier studies suggested: American 
society has calcified and enjoys lower intergenerational economic 
mobility than most other developed nations.154 
As with (intra-generational) inequality, natural rights advocates 
almost surely would argue that any government measures to tilt the 
playing field in favor of greater intergenerational economic mobility 
would constitute a taking. Addressing intergenerational immobility 
requires essentially the same tools as addressing intra-generational 
inequality: taking from the privileged to benefit the underprivileged. 
From a natural property rights perspective, that is a taking simpliciter. 
Yet, as with inequality there are both efficiency and equitable reasons 
to find immobility objectionable. On the efficiency side, having 
parentage determine life chances undermines incentives for hard work 
and creativity for “nobles” and “peasants” alike. In addition, 
immobility tends to lock assets into inefficient usage. On the equity 
side, it is hard to articulate a less fair regime than one dooming the 
children of disadvantage to their parents’ fate (and guaranteeing the 
children of advantage their parents’ privileges). Finally, immobility 
may impose the same sort of “Spirit Level” social tension costs on the 
entrenched nobility as well as the permanent underclass.155 As with 
inequality, the basic theory of public goods tells us that private charity 
to rectify this social ill will be insufficient; solving this problem is a 
public good and thus requires governmental action. 
Diminishing social mobility has multiple causes. Most obviously, it 
is a predictable result of growing income inequality. There are many 
causal channels between growing income inequality among 
generations of parents and the life chances of their children. Recent 
literature has focused on two. First, in an age where education and 
 
 152 There is perhaps no better evidence of the longstanding rags-to-riches ethos in 
America than the extremely popular Horatio Alger fictional stories of impoverished 
but industrious young boys working their way up from homelessness to membership 
in the middle or upper class. See, e.g., HORATIO ALGER, JR., FAME AND FORTUNE, OR THE 
PROGRESS OF RICHARD HUNTER (1868); HORATIO ALGER, JR., RAGGED DICK (1868); 
HORATIO ALGER, JR., STRUGGLING UPWARD, OR LUKE LARKIN’S LUCK (1890). 
 153 See The Fading American Dream, supra note 122, at 8. 
 154 See Recent Trends, supra note 122, at 146. 
 155 See supra text accompanying notes 100–103. 
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intellectual skills are becoming more and more important, the gap 
between rich and poor families in the amounts invested in their 
children’s intellectual enrichment has mushroomed over the last few 
decades.156 Second, growing economic segregation — rich families 
tending to live around only other rich and poor around poor — has 
created environments in which children of privilege tend to enjoy 
more positive role models than their disadvantaged counterparts.157 
In the worst-case scenario, we could experience a “New Feudalism,” 
an America in which the educational and peer advantages enjoyed by 
the wealthy are so powerful that they become permanent.158 We could 
become, at a fundamental level, a version of the British feudalism so 
categorically rejected by our founding generation and the Constitution 
that they bequeathed us. 
One of the most direct and effective tools for stemming the trend 
towards dynastic wealth and socioeconomic mobility is an inheritance 
tax. It weakens one of the most powerful forces blocking 
socioeconomic mobility, the transmission of family wealth. To be sure, 
it is not a complete solution. Wealthy parents can pass on tremendous 
advantages to their children via investments in education and inter 
vivos gifts. Still, inherited wealth provides a powerful channel for 
wealthy decedents to project the advantages that they enjoyed on to 
their progeny. 
Until relatively recently, the other powerful legal rule standing in 
the way of creating dynastic wealth was the Rule Against Perpetuities 
(“RAP”).159 To oversimplify a bit, the RAP prevented those making 
property bequests from indefinitely limiting the use and alienability of 
that property by their direct and subsequent beneficiaries. As a general 
rule, testators making gifts to family members could impose limits on 
property rights only until their youngest grandchild reached the age of 
twenty-one.160 
The RAP signified the victory of forward-looking English judges 
over noble families bent on insuring that land remained in their 
 
 156 Sabino Kornrich & Frank Furstenberg, Investing in Children: Changes in Parental 
Spending on Children, 1972–2007, 50 DEMOGRAPHY 1, 12-13 (2013). 
 157 See Sean F. Reardon & Kendra Bischoff, Income Inequality and Income 
Segregation, 116 AM. J. SOC. 1092, 1100-02 (2011). 
 158 I discuss the forces pushing the United States in this direction in a forthcoming 
book. ERIC KADES, THE NEW FEUDALISM (forthcoming 2019). 
 159 For an exhaustive treatment of the RAP, see generally JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE 
RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (4th ed. 1942). 
 160 See id. at 191 (“No interest is good unless it must vest if at all, not later than 
twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the interest.”). 
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bloodline, perpetuating their privileged position in English society.161 
It remained in place for centuries, largely unaltered, serving the 
important social policies of curbing dynastic wealth, limiting the 
power of the dead over the assets used by the living, and enhancing 
the alienability of land. In the 1980s, however, states began 
eliminating the RAP entirely or lengthening the time of restricting so 
liberally that the restriction had little bite. The cause of this effective 
abolition of the RAP in virtually all states was not due to any 
repudiation of its worthy purposes. It was driven by nothing more 
than interstate competition among banks and other financial entities 
for trust business.162 
The death of the RAP has enabled wealthy decedents to set up truly 
dynastic trusts that last either forever or for a very long time — many, 
many generations.163 Thus the current progressive federal estate tax, 
which imposes a tax of up to 55%, but only on estates with a value of 
$10 million or more,164 stands as the sole governmental counterweight 
to a growing tide of wealth inequality. An influential group of wealthy 
families almost succeeded at having the tax abolished in 2000,165 and 
there is every reason to expect continued attempts to eliminate this 
levy under a Trump administration with Republican control of both 
houses of Congress. 
Natural property rights theories of course deem the federal estate tax 
a taking given its disproportionate impact due mostly to exempting 
estates worth less than $10 million. Epstein, for example, rejects a long 
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line of Supreme Court cases upholding progressive inheritance 
taxation166 with the assertion that “there is no principled distinction 
between the right of property and the right of succession.”167 Anglo-
American legal tradition, however, is squarely to the contrary. No less a 
source than William Blackstone flatly declared in an age of quite 
limited governments and expansive private rights that 
[t]he right of making wills and disposing of property after 
death is merely a creature of the civil state, which has 
permitted it in some countries and denied it in others; and 
even where it is permitted by law, it is subjected to different 
formalities and restrictions in almost every nation under 
heaven.168 
Thomas Jefferson similarly stated quite clearly that there was no 
natural property right for owners to leave their property by their wills. 
The portion occupied by an individual ceases to be his when 
himself ceases to be, and reverts to the society. If the society 
has formed no rules for the appropriation of its lands in 
severalty, it will be taken by the first occupants. These will 
generally be the wife and children of the decedent. If they have 
formed rules of appropriation, those rules may give it to the 
wife and children, or to some one of them, or to the legatee of 
the deceased. So they may give it to his creditor. But the child, 
the legatee or creditor takes it, not by any natural right, but by a 
law of the society of which they are members, and to which they 
are subject.169 
American courts have not deviated from this principle. The right to 
inherit is neither a natural nor a constitutional right but rather a 
statutory creation of the legislature subject to regulation, taxation, and 
even elimination. Here is one example of the courts’ uniform 
perspective: 
 
 166 See, e.g., N.Y. Tr. Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345 (1921) (ruling that a progressive 
federal levy of the estate tax was constitutional); Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 
(1900) (ruling that a progressive state inheritance tax was constitutional); Magoun v. 
Ill. Tr. & Sav. Bank, 170 U.S. 283 (1898) (upholding the estate tax as it is a tax of 
succession and thus, the state can impose conditions on it).  
 167 EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 304. 
 168 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *488, *491. 
 169 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), 
http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/presidents/thomas-jefferson/letters-of-thomas-jefferson/jefl81.php 
(emphasis added). Thanks to my colleague Tom McSweeney for bringing this letter to my 
attention. 
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The law of descent, and the right to devise and take under a 
will, within the state of Illinois, owe their existence to the 
statute law of the state. The right to inherit and the right to 
devise being dependent on the legislative acts, there is nothing 
in the constitution of this state which prohibits a change of 
those subjects at the discretion of the lawmaking power. The 
law of descent and devise being the creation of the statute law, 
the power which creates may regulate and may impose 
conditions or burdens on a right of succession to the 
ownership of property to which there has ceased to be an 
owner because of death, and the ownership of which the state 
then provides for by the law of descent or devise.170 
Thus, there simply is no historical or doctrinal basis on which to 
assert that the rights to give and receive an inheritance are natural or 
constitutional rights. States and the federal government have plenary 
power to abolish inheritance of property and a fortiori may regulate 
and tax bequests in the furtherance of public policies like narrowing 
inequality and fostering socioeconomic mobility. 
At a policy level, large inheritances are a very attractive tax base. 
Although the contribution of the estate tax to the federal fisc is 
modest,171 the tax has attractive efficiency and fairness properties. The 
best evidence suggests that the estate tax causes little if any reduction 
in labor supply or investment.172 The fairness reasons for taxing large 
inheritances are obvious. It is difficult to imagine a set of taxpayers 
more able to bear the burden of a tax without any noticeable effect on 
welfare, and taxing large estates further serves the salutary purpose of 
pushing against the creation of feudal-like dynastic wealth. 
Obviously, the United States cannot rely on estate taxation alone to 
fund the government. There is no reason, however, for the 
government to rely on only one tax base to counter rising inequality 
and sinking mobility. Each tax involves distinct efficiency costs (so-
 
 170 Kochersperger v. Drake, 47 N.E. 321, 321-22 (Ill. 1897). For similar holdings, 
see, for example, In re Fox’s Estate, 117 N.W. 558, 563 (Mich. 1908); State v. Clark, 
71 P. 20, 23 (Wash. 1902). 
 171 In 2014, the federal estate tax raised a bit more than $19 billion, which 
comprised 0.6% of total federal revenue of over $3 trillion. Andrew Lundeen, The 
Estate Tax Provides Less than One Percent of Federal Revenue, TAX FOUND. (Apr. 7. 
2015), https://taxfoundation.org/estate-tax-provides-less-one-percent-federal-revenue. 
 172 For a summary of theoretical and empirical research on the estate tax, including 
a tentative finding that estate “accumulation is not very responsive to tax incentives,” 
see Wojciech Kopczuk, Economics of Estate Taxation: Review of Theory and Evidence, 63 
TAX L. REV. 139, 157 (2009). 
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called “deadweight burden”), efficiency benefits (e.g., delivery of the 
public good charity; addressing “Spirit Level” issues of social tension), 
and fairness benefits. Thus, there is nothing untoward about the 
current co-existence of a progressive income tax and a progressive 
estate tax, and there would be nothing untoward about adding 
Piketty’s proposed tax on wealth to the mix. 
C. Utterly Unattainable Super-Pareto Efficiency 
The last two subparts looked at either side of the government’s 
ledger in isolation from the other. Section II.A considered the benefits 
that flow from delivery of public goods in general and charity in 
particular. Section II.B turned the spotlight exclusively to the revenue 
side and examined the variety of tax bases that governments can use to 
pay for the delivery of public goods. This subpart in effect considers 
both sides of the ledger, benefits and costs, and considers efficiency 
standards used to judge the net combined effect of taxation and public 
services. We consider the range of patterns of winners and losers that 
can result from any public program financed with tax dollars. 
Natural property rights theories are not primarily focused on 
efficiency. Instead, they emphasize categorical rights that trump any 
sort of utility maximization. It is surprising, then, that Epstein’s 
canonical statement of natural property rights actually introduces an 
entirely new and unprecedentedly demanding social welfare criteria. 
His innovation, which I dub “super-Pareto efficiency,” has heretofore 
gone unnoticed. 
We will use simple pie charts to illustrate alternative conceptions of 
efficiency and introduce super-Pareto efficiency. Each concept is 
illustrated based on the following common starting point used by 
Epstein:173 
 
 173 EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 4. 
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Figure 3 
 
This diagram represents the initial distribution of income (or wealth) 
in a simple society of six individuals, labeled a to f. By “initial” Epstein 
means in the “state of nature,” before any government is formed to 
solve collective action problems and deliver public goods. In this 
example, individual e enjoys the biggest slice of the social pie, well 
over 25%. Individual b has the second highest welfare, at about 25%. 
At the other extreme, a and d have about 10% of income/wealth. 
When individuals band together to form a government, almost any 
action that the new state takes will affect individual wealth 
asymmetrically. On the burden side this is obvious: different tax 
regimes will of course have different income and wealth effects. The 
benefit side is a bit more complex. Building a new road might benefit 
everyone but is unlikely to benefit everyone in exactly the same dollar 
amount or in proportion to their initial wealth. It is possible, 
moreover, that the new road may help some individuals but harm 
others (e.g., by reducing traffic in front of their store on an existing 
road). So too with a decision to fight a war: makers of munitions will 
benefit but makers of luxury sedans likely will suffer. 
The primary issue addressed by the welfare standards we are about 
to examine is the distribution of net gains from public measures after 
accounting for individuals’ tax payments. The most basic requirement 
is simple efficiency: government programs should increase the total 
size of the social pie.174 
The most workable efficiency standard is Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, 
which requires nothing more than that the governmental activity 
under consideration increase the size of the social pie.175 Formally, it 
 
 174 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 13, at 11-15. 
 175 Id. at 13-14.  
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is often phrased as the requirement that the winners from the activity 
have the ability to compensate the losers — without actually requiring 
compensation. It is easy to see that this amounts to the same thing as 
requiring an increase in the size of the pie. The following diagram 
provides a rather extreme example of the workings of Kaldor-Hicks 
efficiency. 
Figure 4 
 
In this figure, the shaded outer ring represents the expansion in net 
wealth due to some governmental program (e.g., construction of a 
new road) after accounting for both the tax costs and the program 
benefits to each citizen. Note that a and b have captured all of the net 
increase in social wealth. That may seem unfair, but does not violate 
the requirements of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. More subtly, by 
comparison with the initial position in Figure 3, note that e has 
suffered an actual reduction in wealth while f has enjoyed a 
corresponding rise. The transfer is marked by the dashed line and the 
area labeled e-/f+. This could be the product of many things, perhaps 
most simply asymmetric taxation. Again, there is no violation of 
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. The size of the pie has increased, and a, b, 
and f could afford to compensate e for her losses without foregoing all 
of their gains. 
Although Kaldor-Hicks efficiency does not guarantee universal 
gains, many if not most economists think that, accounting for 
practicalities, it is the best that large, complex modern societies can 
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expect to achieve.176 In a nation like the United States, with a 
population of over 325 million,177 any significant public program is 
going to have winners as well as losers. Obamacare surely benefited 
many lower-income Americans, but arguably imposed costs on healthy 
younger workers.178 Building a new gas pipeline may save consumers 
billions in energy costs but will expose those along the route to risks 
of environmental harm and could pose a threat to culturally sacred 
Indian lands.179 Financial regulation might prevent extraordinarily 
costly financial meltdowns like the one that occurred in 2007, but 
almost surely reduces bank profits. 
A theoretically preferable alternative to Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is 
Pareto efficiency, which requires that governmental programs increase 
the welfare of at least one citizen without diminishing the welfare of 
any other citizen.180 In plain English, nobody gets hurt and at least one 
person gets helped. One obvious way to implement Pareto efficiency 
in the real world is to require those enjoying gains to pay a portion of 
those gains to make up the losses of any losers. The following figure, 
building off of Figure 4, gives an example of how this works. 
 
 176 Id. at 13-15. 
 177 U.S. and World Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/ 
popclock (last visited Dec. 28, 2017). 
 178 Michele Lerner, 8 Health Insurance Reform Winners and Losers, BANKRATE (Jan. 
24, 2014), https://www.bankrate.com/finance/insurance/health-insurance-reform-
winners-losers-1.aspx#slide=3. 
 179 See Justin Worland, What to Know About the Dakota Access Pipeline Protests, 
TIME (Oct. 28, 2016), http://time.com/4548566/dakota-access-pipeline-standing-rock-
sioux. 
 180 See POSNER, supra note 13, at 12-13. 
  
2018] The Natural Property Rights Straitjacket 1405 
Figure 5 
 
Contrasting this with Figure 4, e still suffers a loss to f, but a and b 
have given up a portion of their gains (a+ and b+ in the outer, shaded 
ring have shrunk) such that these “side-payments” to e (the outer 
shaded area e+) exceed the size of e’s loss to f (again the area labeled e-
/f+ in the inner circle). 
The problem with Pareto efficiency in the real world is that making 
all of the side payments necessary to meet the standard is effectively 
impossible.181 Major governmental programs to deal with medical 
insurance, large public works projects like gas pipelines, and 
regulation of large industries like the financial sector create literally 
hundreds of thousands or even millions of losers in a large economy 
like America’s. Simply identifying all of the affected parties, let alone 
calculating the size of their losses, is prohibitively expensive. 
That said, the just compensation requirement of the Takings Clause 
is a constitutional nod in the direction of Pareto efficiency. When the 
government needs a citizen’s property for a public project, one 
alternative is to simply take it without paying a cent — perhaps 
labeling the taking a “special tax.” This, of course, would leave most 
other citizens with a small incremental gain: marginally lower taxes, 
since no compensation is paid to the targeted property owner. This 
would, of course impose a relatively large loss on that targeted 
 
 181 Id. 
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property owner. The compensation requirement thus serves as a 
modest tool to move from Kaldor-Hicks to Pareto efficiency in a 
relatively small class of easy cases: the complete expropriation of well-
defined property interests from one person or a relatively small group 
of people. 
Epstein notes this relationship between Pareto efficiency and the 
Takings Clause, saying that 
[t]he [Takings] clause seems even more stringent [than 
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency], given that it requires actual 
compensation, not hypothetical compensation as the Kaldor-
Hicks formula envisions. The clause seems to embody a 
constitutional Pareto criterion, in which shifts in legal 
entitlements are possible only if at least one person is made 
better off, and no person is made worse off.182 
Epstein, however, tries to extend this limited tool governing small-
number takings to cover all taxation and other legislation. This is a 
futile exercise. Economists have long understood that Pareto efficiency 
is more a theoretical baseline than a workable tool for shaping public 
policy. 
In what is perhaps the most surprising unnoticed feature of Takings, 
it turns out that even Pareto efficiency is insufficiently protective of 
property rights for Epstein’s articulation of natural rights theory. 
Though omitting to label or herald it, Epstein in fact proposes a new 
efficiency standard, one that I label (for reasons that will be made 
clear) “super-Pareto efficiency.” Epstein nutshells this standard as 
follows: “The sovereign is allowed to take from the citizens only those 
funds that are necessary to operate the state. The rest of the surplus 
subject to that tax lien should be divided among all citizens, pro rata in 
accordance with their private holdings.”183 He actually includes the idea 
in the introduction, illustrating it with the following (slightly 
modified) diagram.184 
 
 182 EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 201. 
 183 Id. at 163 (emphasis added). 
 184 Id. at 4. 
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Figure 6 
 
Starting from the initial position shown above in Figure 3 (reproduced 
here as the inner white circle), the increase in social wealth due to a 
governmental activity (the outer gray ring) is divided among citizens 
in strict proportion to their initial wealth. The absolute size of 
everyone’s slice of the pie grows, but the size of each slice relative to 
the total pie is unchanged. The dashed lines portioning out the 
expansion in wealth simply continue along the same track as the lines 
dividing up the initial pie. 
Pareto efficiency guarantees only that no citizen’s absolute wealth 
decreases as a result of governmental actions. Although much less 
permissive than Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, this still leaves the 
government with a fair amount of leeway to distribute the gains from a 
given policy measure. Epstein’s new standard is exceedingly limiting. 
It dictates that the gains from all state actions must be apportioned 
strictly in proportion to current wealth. This is an extraordinarily 
conservative doctrine, freezing into place the current distribution of 
wealth — at least as concerns governmental acts. 
Moreover, it is even more of a pipe dream than already-unattainable 
Pareto efficiency — hence the moniker “super-Pareto efficiency.” 
Compensation for the losses of large numbers of citizens no longer 
suffices. Instead, the government would have to calibrate 
compensation to each loser’s initial wealth. To illustrate the 
seriousness of the problem, we will highlight the complexity of 
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implementing super-Pareto efficiency with a couple of examples.185 In 
each case, we assume that the proposed governmental project is 
Kaldor-Hicks efficient — that the sum of all benefits from the project 
exceeds all of the costs (taxes) required to effectuate the project. 
First, consider the prosaic case of the construction of a new road, 
one that will significantly reduce traffic on an existing road nearby. 
With fewer people making trips past their doors, owners of businesses 
along the old road will suffer a decline in business — quite possibly a 
serious decline.186 Epstein might argue that there is no requirement to 
pay compensation on such facts because there is no taking in the first 
place: owners have no property rights in vehicles passing in front of a 
business. He explicitly rejects this line of reasoning, however, in his 
long and impassioned argument that the government must pay for lost 
business goodwill (like reduced traffic and dispersion of customers) 
when it engages in urban renewal that changes neighborhoods.187 
Epstein contends that the government must pay compensation for 
goodwill lost not only by owners whose property is taken, but also 
must compensate owners of parcels not taken whose businesses suffer 
due to large changes in the neighborhood. There is no principled 
distinction between owners of such untaken properties and the 
owners of businesses along the old road in our example.188 
Imagine the task of trying to calculate super-Pareto efficiency 
compensation amounts for owners along the old road in the aftermath 
of the new road’s construction. Public officials would first need to 
calculate the net increase in total social wealth due to the new road. 
They would next need to calculate the reduction in property value for 
each parcel along the old road. Finally, they would need information 
 
 185 In these examples, Pareto efficiency is problematic as well but less problematic 
than super-Pareto efficiency. 
 186 Old U.S. Route 66 is one of the most famous examples of a popular highway 
losing traffic to new roads — the federal interstate highway system. E.g., Christina 
Crapanzano, Route 66, TIME (June 28, 2010), http://content.time.com/time/nation/ 
article/0,8599,2000095,00.html (discussing how “the no-tell motels and mom-and-
pop shops along the road disappeared” when nearby interstate highways were built); 
U.S. Route 66, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._Route_66 (last visited 
Dec. 29, 2017).  
 187 EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 80-86. 
 188 Epstein tries to distinguish urban renewal from new roads by arguing that 
urban renewal, unlike new roads, involves the “use of force or misrepresentation to 
limit the [property owner’s] prospective relationships with third parties.” Id. at 83. 
Why using condemnation is force in one case (urban renewal) but not in the other 
(building roads) is said to be “too obvious and too persuasive to be denied,” but no 
substantive case is made and at least one of Epstein’s readers does not find the 
distinction obvious or persuasive. Id. 
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on the wealth of each of these landowners. Calculating compensation 
under Epstein’s super-Pareto efficiency requires all of this information 
— a daunting task indeed. 
To take an even more daunting example, consider the decision to 
fight a war. There will be big winners and big losers. Manufacturers of 
tanks and boots can anticipate record profits, while those making 
passenger sedans and loafers likely will face some lean years. Those 
owning property in Washington, D.C. and near military bases will 
enjoy robust demand, while those with interests at risk of destruction 
due to the conflict (abroad or domestically) will see the market value 
of their assets tumble.189 Attempting to calculate the compensation 
due to the losers under the requirements of super-Pareto efficiency 
again encounters the insuperable informational and administrative 
demands enumerated in the case of a new road. 
So far, we have examined only those suffering losses under new road 
construction or decisions to fight a war. Super-Pareto efficiency, 
however, also requires symmetrically difficult administrative costs in 
dealing with those enjoying gains. Epstein’s new efficiency standard 
dictates that all gains from governmental projects must be distributed 
in strict proportion to pre-project wealth. The only way to fund the 
payment of losers is to impose special taxes on the winners — that is 
where the increment to pre-existing wealth goes, and so winners’ gains 
must serve as the source of compensation. To impose such taxes, the 
government again must calculate the magnitude of the gains for each 
property owner who comes out ahead and must estimate each owner’s 
current wealth. When we account for winners as well as losers, the 
already intractable demands of super-Pareto efficiency double. 
It is easy to see the fundamental source of difficulty with 
implementing Epstein’s super-Pareto efficiency: prohibitive 
administrative costs. In the abstract there might be defenses of super-
Pareto efficiency, but in practice it is simply too expensive to 
implement. This observation is nothing new. In one of the most 
influential and widely-cited article on takings ever published, 
predating Epstein’s book by almost twenty years, Frank Michelman 
included such costs as an integral component of his test for whether or 
not to pay compensation.190 
 
 189 See, e.g., United States v. Caltex, 344 U.S. 149 (1952) (holding, inter alia, U.S. 
government not responsible for private assets destroyed to prevent enemy from 
capturing them); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135 (1921) (holding rent control statute 
enacted in Washington D.C. during World War I to manage spike in demand for 
housing in capital city did not constitute a taking). 
 190 Michelman, supra note 6, at 1215. Michelman labels these administrative costs 
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Making implementation of super-Pareto efficiency even more 
unrealistic, Epstein maintains that each specific government project, 
on its own, must meet the super-Pareto efficiency standard. He 
expresses deep mistrust of permitting public officials to argue that 
although programs A, B, and C each on their own violate the standard, 
when considered together do deliver roughly proportional gains to 
each citizen.191 He labels such arguments “step transactions”; perhaps 
a better label is “packaging.” He would permit lawmakers to package 
multiple programs for purposes of determining super-Pareto efficiency 
only if they are part of a common plan and argues that judges should 
begin with a presumption against the existence of such a plan.192 
Epstein’s anti-packaging view is fundamentally at odds with the 
realistic operation of a democratic state, especially a large one. 
Desirable (efficient) important public policies have widely divergent 
welfare effects. For the United States in the current age, free trade 
helps owners of mobile capital and those with skilled labor in demand 
worldwide, but it hurts both domestic producers of products with 
significant foreign competition and unskilled laborers.193 Subsidizing 
public colleges and universities benefits most middle class and some 
poorer citizens but works to the disadvantage of poorer citizens 
unqualified for higher education at one extreme and wealthy families 
with no need for financial aid and no desire for a larger pool of 
competing skilled laborers. Environmental legislation yields material 
benefits to most citizens but raises the costs of some manufacturers. 
There is a strong case that all three of these measures (free trade, 
subsidized education, and environmental protection laws) are socially 
efficient. Assembling a coalition to support any one of them, however, 
may be difficult — especially if opponents are well-organized and 
stand to suffer large losses while a much larger group of winners, 
although enjoying large total gains, each benefit only modestly and do 
not form a cohesive group.194 Democracy, however, gives different 
interests the ability to engage in “horse-trading” or “logrolling” — you 
vote for my proposal and I’ll vote for yours.195 This can enable the 
 
as “settlement costs,” and argues that compensation need not be paid if these 
settlement costs are greater than the demoralization costs created by failure to 
compensate. Id. 
 191 See EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 210. 
 192 See id. at 209-10. 
 193 See supra notes 112–115 and accompanying text. 
 194 See generally MANCUR OLSEN, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 53-65 (1971) 
(writing on “[t]he coherence and effectiveness of small groups”). 
 195 See RANDALL HOLCOMBE, PUBLIC SECTOR ECONOMICS: THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT 
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legislature to pass our three proposals as a package even if each one, 
on its own, would not have garnered a majority. The hope then is that 
over the long run, with many different coalitions backing different 
public policy measures, most citizens will enjoy roughly equal net 
gains. If all or most proposals yield net gains (i.e., are Kaldor-Hicks 
efficient) and if no groups are consistently on the losing side, then the 
Law of Large Numbers guarantees that this indeed will be the case.196 
D. Natural Rights in Historical Context 
So far, throughout this Article, we have taken the existing 
distribution of wealth (or income) as given and focused on just how 
far the government can go in altering property rights before courts will 
find a taking and order payment of just compensation. It is time to 
examine a foundational question: how do we determine if the existing 
distribution of property is justified? To the extent that a society’s 
property distribution is inefficient or unjust, state action, such as 
wealth taxation, to rectify the injustice seems entirely warranted. What 
looks like a taking in a world of justly apportioned property rights will 
not look like a taking in a world of unjustly distributed wealth. 
Natural rights are universal, inalienable rights that exist 
independently of rights created by governments. Such natural rights 
exist even without a state — in the so-called “state of nature.” This 
refers to an environment without any organized government. Thomas 
Hobbes, one of the first political theorists to discuss the state of 
nature, described it as an environment of “continual fear, and danger 
of violent death: and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and 
short.”197 Much if not most of the voluminous writings on natural 
rights discuss the state of nature ahistorically — without reference to 
identified periods of disorder and chaos.198 Philip Hamburger summed 
up early American understandings of natural rights as follows: 
On the assumption that the state of nature was a condition in 
which all humans were equally free from subjugation to one 
 
IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 179-81 (Jeff Shelstad et al. eds., 2006). For a more 
technical analysis of logrolling, see generally Robert Wilson, An Axiomatic Model of 
Logrolling, 59 AM. ECON. REV. 331 (1969) (analyzing logrolling in relation to the 
General Possibility Theorem). 
 196 See Yew-Kwang Ng, Quasi-Pareto Social Improvements, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 1033, 
1035 (1984). 
 197 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 97 (Oxford Press 1929) (1651). 
 198 See EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 7-12, 333-34; NOZICK, supra note 2, at 10-12, 118-
19, 198-204; Claeys, Jefferson Meets Coase, supra note 2, at 1402-03.  
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another — in which individuals had no common superior — 
Americans understood natural liberty to be the freedom of 
individuals in the state of nature. That is, they understood 
natural liberty to be the freedom an individual could enjoy as a 
human in the absence of government. A natural right was 
simply a portion of this undifferentiated natural liberty.199 
This is a more abstract and benevolent vision of the state of nature, 
with the emphasis not on Hobbes’ all-too-imaginable war of all against 
all but rather on the abstract notion of equality and liberty in a world 
without any government. 
Although the abstract notion of a state of nature has some utility for 
political theorizing, I believe that rooting the notion in history 
provides necessary context. The key piece of context is feudalism, the 
socioeconomic system of government that emerged after the fall of 
Rome and the resulting chaos in a Europe suffering from ubiquitous 
internal disorder and external depredations from the north (Vikings), 
south (Moors), and east (Asiatic tribes).200 Feudalism arose in reaction 
to this real-world state of nature. It created a small ruling class of 
warriors (kings and their legions of knights) to (i) maintain internal 
law and order and (ii) repel external threats.201 Providing armor, arms, 
horses, training, and wages for knights was expensive. To fund these 
forces necessary to maintain even a semblance of order, knights were 
granted ownership of land — the only form of wealth that really 
mattered during this age.202 Essentially everyone else became a peasant 
farmer, a class of lowly tenants who owned no property and hence 
relied for their livelihood on leasing arable land from their landlord 
(the local knight). They handed over a large portion of their harvest to 
their landlord, and in addition often were required to contribute 
significant amounts of labor to farming portions of their landlord’s 
estate not leased out (his “demesne” or domain).203 
Feudalism was the essential background for both early natural law 
theorists and America’s founding generation. Theorists like Hobbes 
and John Locke were either justifying or challenging the divine rights 
 
 199 Philip A. Hamburger, Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American Constitutions, 
102 YALE L.J. 907, 918-19 (1993) (footnote omitted). 
 200 MARC BLOCH, FEUDAL SOCIETY 3-38 (L.A. Manyon trans., 1961). 
 201 See WIM BLOCKMANS & PETER HOPPENBROUWERS, INTRODUCTION TO MEDIEVAL 
EUROPE, 300–1550, at 3-5 (Isola van den Hoven trans., 2002). 
 202 Id. at 70. 
 203 See id. at 72-75, 112-13; JEAN-PIERRE POLY & ERIC BOURNAZEL, THE FEUDAL 
TRANSFORMATION, 900–1200, at 136 (Caroline Higgit trans., 1991). 
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of royalty ensconced at the top of the feudal hierarchy.204 More 
profoundly, America’s founding generation was rebelling against an 
English society still to a large extent defined by feudalism and sharp 
class lines. In eighteenth century England, even though many of the 
elements of feudalism were fading away, still all men were not equal in 
the eyes of the law.205 
That feudalism embodied an extremely unequal division of wealth 
and, moreover, a lack of intergenerational socioeconomic mobility, is 
beyond a doubt.206 Still, not all inequality is unjust. Indeed, a major 
implication of Epstein’s argument is that the wealthy deserve 
protection from the masses using government to expropriate their 
property. The question is: was the wealth inequality created by 
feudalism just or unjust? 
Two different models of the birth of feudalism help frame answers 
to this question.207 In Feudalism Origins I (“Feudalism I”), local 
toughs in each region of Europe took advantage of their strength and 
organizational skills to impose the feudal hierarchy on an unwilling 
population. This is imposition of tyranny and extreme inequality 
without consent. For those believing in natural rights and for those 
believing in less abstract notions of justice, Feudalism I is unjust. State 
action to undo inequality created by Feudalism I seems 
uncontroversial. 
Feudalism Origins II (“Feudalism II”) is slightly more complicated. 
In addition to local toughs, we have brigands — thieves and pillagers 
who constantly target defenseless peasants. Unlike the brigands, the 
toughs do not prey on the peasants. They are able to defend 
themselves but do not defend the peasants — and natural rights 
theorists would emphasize that they have no natural duty to rescue 
others in distress.208 Toughs in Feudalism II see an opportunity for 
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mutual gain and make a proposal to the peasants. If the peasants will 
cede to the toughs title to all lands (which was essentially all wealth in 
the Middle Ages) and agree to perform some labors on part of the land 
for the toughs, the toughs will agree to (i) lease the remainder of the 
land to the peasants at pretty steep rents, and (ii) protect the peasants 
from the brigands and from any foreign invaders. To sharpen 
contrasts, assume that the toughs can afford to impose internal order 
and repel external invaders only by striking such a hard bargain with 
the peasants. 
It is difficult to maintain that the toughs in Feudalism II have 
violated any natural rights of the peasants, or to paint the system that 
they proposed and the peasants accepted as unjust. True, the toughs 
for whatever reason were tougher (hence their moniker!) and better 
organized than the peasants, but it is not their fault that there were 
brigands and foreign invaders running roughshod all over the country. 
The toughs had no duty to rescue the peasants. They simply made a 
proposal that promised mutual benefits, albeit with the lion’s share of 
the benefits accruing to the toughs themselves. Note that the toughs 
do not satisfy Epstein’s super-Pareto efficiency, as they enjoy a 
disproportionate share of the gains from establishing a government 
able to maintain law and order. Their proposal does, however, satisfy 
Pareto efficiency: the toughs clearly think their new plan will make 
them better off, and the peasants would not agree to the plan unless it 
improved their sorry lot, no matter how marginally. This is a signal 
weakness of super-Pareto efficiency: it rejects many deals favored by 
all parties. 
So far, so good: Feudalism II meets the relatively demanding 
standards of Pareto efficiency. But Feudalism II becomes troubling 
when we note that it creates property rights that last forever. There is 
no need to assume some form of serfdom legally tying the peasants to 
the lands of their lords and the labors of their parents. With the right 
to leave large landed estates by will to successive generations, the 
toughs, soon called lords, entrench the socioeconomic status of 
themselves and their progeny indefinitely. Long after order has been 
restored and thus their essential role in maintaining peace and order 
has disappeared, the lordly descendants of the toughs will continue to 
own the lion’s share of wealth. 
Feudalism II poses a real problem for natural rights theorists. Given 
the peasants’ consent to inherited hierarchy, it simply is not possible 
to argue that their natural rights have been violated. Natural rights 
include the right to strike bargains, even when they turn out badly. 
Yet, we are left with a system that propagates inequality generation 
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after generation. Although the vestiges of feudalism in Britain today 
are relatively modest, they still do exist: a monarch deriving millions 
of dollars a year from Britain’s Crown Estate,209 and a host of noble 
families with large estates traceable to the Domesday Book. Moreover, 
the society borne of feudalism in 1066 remained largely in place well 
into the nineteenth century — a stretch of about 800 years.210 Though 
not forever, eight centuries is a very long time to endure a largely 
frozen socioeconomic hierarchy. 
Natural rights theorists are surprisingly insensitive to this concern 
and, moreover, quite cavalier about the establishment of property 
rights in the first place. Epstein, for example, requires that every 
public policy measure increase everyone’s wealth proportionally 
(super-Pareto efficiency), but imposes no such super-fairness 
requirement at the critical initial stage of property distribution from 
the commons. He asserts that: 
[T]here is a general consensus that exclusive, or at least well-
defined, property rights over particular things will expand the 
size of the social pie. Any system which takes things of value 
out of a common pool and subjects them to well-defined rights 
should in principle be able to generate sufficient wealth to 
satisfy the compensation requirement of the eminent domain 
clause.211 
We can agree with the general consensus that private property rights 
are efficient (i.e., they expand the size of the social pie). The second 
sentence, however, is deeply troubling and inconsistent with the 
super-Pareto efficiency standard. Creating property rights is a state 
project, so where is his requirement to distribute the gains from the 
project in strict proportion with everyone’s pre-existing wealth? 
Natural rights theorists also seem to grossly underestimate the 
powerful role played by property in the creation of wealth. Citing 
Locke, for example, Epstein simply declares that “when labor is mixed 
with property, 99% of their combined value is attributable to labor.”212 
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Simple, well-established empirical facts on the ancient practice of 
share-cropping, however, demonstrate that land has long played a 
much larger role in wealth creation than the 1% conjectured by Locke. 
In ancient Rome, peasants typically paid a third of their crop to their 
landlords; in ancient Egypt the fraction was a full half.213 Medieval 
peasants paid rents approaching half of their annual crop.214 This was 
not the sole form of rent, as peasants frequently paid money rents and 
in addition had a duty to work their lord’s land for significant chunks 
of time.215 Little changed from ancient to modern times. Chinese 
share-cropping peasants in the 1930s paid from 29 to 69% of their 
crop over to their landlords.216 Sharecropping African-Americans in 
the post-slavery American South paid over to their landlords anywhere 
from a third to half of their annual crop.217 
Far from accounting for only 1% of the value of land, these simple 
sharecropping contracts spanning millennia suggest that real property 
(arable land) generally accounts for at least a third of the value of 
agricultural production and frequently much more. Thus, contra 
empirically unanchored Lockean natural rights assertions, labor does 
not create virtually all value; rather, those who own property enjoy 
considerable economic advantages over those who own nothing of 
value — unless Lockean natural rights theorists mean to contend that 
land owners have been grossly overcompensated since time 
immemorial. That would indeed be a surprising reaction from 
defenders of property and its privileges, and of course would challenge 
fundamental economic theories about the way in which markets give 
rise to efficient prices. 
Lest anyone contend that Feudalism II is at odds with the historical 
record, there is significant evidence that it better captures the contours 
of the transition from the Age of Rome into the Middle Ages than 
Feudalism I. Here is how one basic reference summarizes the 
evolution of feudal land relations: 
Free farmers, weak and defenseless before barbarian invaders, 
brigands, and greedy officials, sought protection from 
powerful local landowners. In return for support and 
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protection, small landholders surrendered their lands to, and 
became the dependents of, the strong. The weak became 
bound to the soil, working their patron’s lands; they lost their 
freedom, could not move, and became serfs. This trend toward 
serfdom continued to the 11th century.218 
Wim Blockmans and Peter Hoppenbrouwers similarly offer a more 
detailed description of the birth of feudalism that squares much better 
with Feudalism II than with Feudalism I: 
Lack of safety and an increasing tax burden persuaded many 
originally free smallholders to place themselves under the 
protection of a neighboring landowner. Sometimes this 
happened by way of a formal transaction known as a precaria 
(literally meaning “request”) in which the peasant 
relinquished his land and paid a fee in recognition of his 
landlord. In return he retained the right to use the land. Many 
others acquired the status of colonus, which tied the peasant 
to the land the landowner allowed them to work in exchange 
for part of the produce and often also specific services. In this 
way the large landowners usurped the dwindling powers of the 
state by taking the law into their own hands and by 
strengthening their position of power through patronage over 
weaker individuals.219 
David Herlihy offers yet more evidence in this vein.220 He found 
records showing that one path to higher social status for strong men 
with modest capital in the early Middle Ages was to build a castle in an 
unsettled area, attract colonizing peasants from disorderly districts 
nearby, and let them settle under the protection of the castle. The 
enterprising developer/castellan in effect grabbed land out of the 
commons and offered terms of settlement. Those who agreed to 
become his (and his progeny’s) peasants, paying onerous rents and 
taxes, were not forced into serfdom. Rather, their decision to migrate 
to the new feudal estate must have been based on a belief that, 
whatever its shortcomings, this new life offered better prospects than 
their current lord’s terms. 
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The historical record, then, contains significant evidence that 
Western Europe’s transition from the chaotic “state of nature” created 
in the wake of the fall of the Roman Empire involved voluntary 
assumption of property-less serfdom by the weak in return for 
protection from the strong. Given that freedom of contract is one of its 
fundamental axioms,221 it is difficult to see how natural property rights 
theory can avoid a whole-hearted endorsement of medieval feudalism 
and the centuries of legally-mandated subservient status imposed on 
the vast majority of Western Europe’s population. 
E. An Overarching Status Quo Bias 
This unseemly embrace of the odious feudal hierarchy provides 
insight into a more general shortcoming. Like any excessively broad 
conception of property rights, natural property rights theory imposes 
socially undesirable levels of bias in favor of the status quo and 
especially in favor of elements of the status quo that have existed for 
an extended stretch of time. 
We have covered one example above: business goodwill. Recall the 
argument that if the government builds a new road that reduces traffic 
on an old road, it must pay compensation to businesses on the old 
road that suffer a reduction in business due to re-routing of some 
traffic onto the new road.222 This gives the status quo pattern of retail 
trade a privileged status. It is doubtful that such a rule is efficient or 
fair. Societies periodically need new roads and part of the reason may 
be to provide more convenient trade for a citizenry that may be both 
growing and shifting its patterns of residence and trade. The 
government makes not even an implicit promise to existing businesses 
that it will refrain from building roads that might harm their 
businesses, and thus it is difficult to make either a fairness or an 
efficiency case for this natural property rights contention. 
Miller v. Schoene,223 a famous Supreme Court takings case, illustrates 
another aspect of this status quo bias. In Miller, the Court upheld a 
Virginia statute ordering the destruction, without compensation, of 
cedar trees close enough to apple orchards to pass along a fungus 
(cedar rust) that is benignly harbored by cedar trees but malignant for 
infected apple trees. Epstein objects based on his observation that the 
 
 221 See NOZICK, supra note 2, at 160-64 (discussing why freedom of contract 
between a famous basketball player and his fans causes inequality and that such 
freedoms should trump desires for equal incomes). 
 222 See supra text accompanying notes 187–188. 
 223 276 U.S. 272 (1928). 
  
2018] The Natural Property Rights Straitjacket 1419 
apple orchard owners would not have a private nuisance claim against 
the cedar tree owners because they did not act in any way that caused 
the fungus to invade the plaintiffs’ apple trees. Surely, Epstein would 
not object to a new statute that, presumably based on newfound 
scientific knowledge, prospectively barred new plantings of cedar trees 
within the proximity of apple orchards. This is the simplest sort of 
efficient property protection law one can imagine. This lays bare the 
extraordinarily privileged status that natural property rights theories 
confer on current usage — the status quo. 
The same logic applies to wetlands regulation. Scientific research of 
relatively recent vintage has demonstrated the adverse environmental 
impacts of land development that destroyed large swaths of 
wetlands.224 This has led many local, state, and federal agencies to 
regulate development of such land.225 Epstein objects, arguing that 
restrictions on developing wetland parcels permit neighbors to capture 
aesthetic and environmental benefits at the cost of wetlands owners 
who have not violated any common law rights. As with cedar rust, 
however, shouldn’t changing science change property rights? If a 
company spends a billion dollars to construct a factory to develop a 
new drug that is later found to be a carcinogen (think DES from 
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories226), does the Takings Clause really 
require the government to compensate the manufacturer for the value 
of the factory if it wants to ban the use of the drug? The answer must 
be, and is, of course not. Then why are wetlands any different? New 
scientific findings as a matter of simple supply and demand can cause 
the value of all sorts of property to increase or decrease, sometimes 
dramatically. 
To examine a slightly different dimension of the same phenomenon, 
consider the married women’s property acts.227 Before their passage in 
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the nineteenth century, married women generally could not own 
property; for husbands, what was his was his, and what was hers was 
his. The married women’s property acts gave women the legal right to 
hold property on the same terms as men.228 When passed, however, 
the acts were generally not applied retroactively: women married after 
an act passed would enjoy the benefits of the legislation, but women 
married prior to passage did not enjoy any increased ability to own 
property.229 Thus, the status quo was preserved for those already 
married. Presumably, natural rights theorists would approve. 
Yet, was this the proper approach to a law remedying a fundamental 
violation of a basic human right like the right to hold property? If so, 
should the Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, 
abolishing slavery, have applied only retroactively, freeing future-born 
children of slaves, but preserving the enslaved status of slaves living at 
the amendment’s ratification in 1865? That would have been 
inconsistent with the notion that slavery always and everywhere is an 
evil and that it was a generation-spanning violation of the most basic 
of human rights of every American slave. When a population’s moral 
sensibilities change, it may be time for dramatic, immediate changes to 
social and economic relations. Applying the Thirteenth Amendment 
only prospectively would have suggested that it was not quite time yet 
to restore freedom to every American. Applying it retroactively instead 
emphasized that it was long past the time at which every slave should 
have been freed. 
If natural property rights stands at one pole in its attachment to the 
status quo, Louis Kaplow’s theory of legal evolution is at the other. In 
Legal Transitions,230 Kaplow argues that legal change is no different 
from other sorts of changes that alter market conditions (e.g., changes 
in weather, technology, consumer preferences).231 If one accepts this 
premise, he then demonstrates that in general there should be no 
compensation or transition relief for any legal innovations.232 Just as 
individuals must prepare for and guard against unpredictable weather, 
new technology, or evolving consumer desires, so too should they deal 
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with legal risk. Any form of compensation or transition relief (e.g., 
prospective application only, slow phase-in of a new law) do positive 
harm to the economy: they obviate the need for people to think 
carefully about how the law might evolve and so create a serious moral 
hazard problem — much like the incentives to adopt less healthy 
lifestyles when total medical bills do not rise substantially with use of 
medical resources. 
Turning our lens back to taxation, Kaplow’s view is that when the 
government decides to change tax laws, it should not provide any 
transition relief to taxpayers.233 From his perspective, taxpayers should 
note that tax laws change with some frequency and should plan and 
order their affairs accordingly. In contrast, natural property rights 
theories, with their bias in favor of the status quo, would suggest that 
the government should provide compensation to those who relied on 
tax law X only to see it replaced with tax law Y that diminished the 
value of their property (e.g., an increase in the capital gains tax rate). 
Needless to say, given the relatively frequent changes to the federal 
income tax code, actually paying just compensation in all such cases 
would be administratively daunting. 
III. A MORE WORKABLE APPROACH TO POLICING TAXATION 
In this final substantive part critiquing natural property rights 
theory, we leave behind these concerns over transition rules and 
return to consider the more fundamental issue of the constitutionality, 
under the Takings Clause, of the wide range of general revenue tax 
rate structures (differing degrees of regressive, flat, or progressive 
taxation). The preceding sections have laid out three important 
problems with applying a natural rights version of the Takings Clause 
to tax policy. 
(i) The theory of public goods in general and charity in 
particular provides ample justification for progressive taxation 
and other forms of redistribution. 
(ii)The government has wide discretion in the choice of tax 
bases. 
(iii) The super-Pareto efficiency standard is completely 
infeasible. 
The combined import of all problems might suggest that the Takings 
Clause cannot impose any restraints on the power of taxation. This, 
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however, is not so. Calvin Massey makes the point with a stark 
hypothetical. “Surely an income tax of 100% imposed on a single 
individual — for example, Bill Gates — would violate the Takings 
Clause. If that is so, then the problem becomes a matter of degree.”234 
Epstein makes the case in more general terms, noting that “the 
differences between [taxation and takings] all go to matters of detail 
and technique, rather than to basic principle . . . both may be used as 
instruments of confiscation.”235 
The difficulty is trying to draw this line between taxes that amount 
to takings and taxes that do not. As we have seen, natural property 
rights theory draws the line such that the overlap between taxes and 
takings is quite large — indeed only a single tax, the flat tax, falls 
outside of the just compensation requirement. Is there any way to 
avoid such an excessive overlap, so that the legislature has 
significantly more discretion in setting tax policy, but that still deems 
measures like Massey’s “Bill Gates” tax as takings? 
I have articulated just such a standard, centered on the Continuous 
Burdens Principle (“CBP”).236 This approach begins with the Supreme 
Court’s most commonly cited policy rationale for the Takings Clause 
and its Just Compensation requirement: “The Fifth Amendment’s 
guarantee that private property shall not be taken for a public use 
without just compensation was designed to bar the Government from 
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness 
and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”237 In most 
important takings cases decided over the last thirty years, either the 
majority or a dissent have cited this language in the course of arguing 
how to apply the Takings Clause to difficult scenarios.238 I dub this the 
“anti-singling-out” principle. 
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The anti-singling-out principle dovetails well with legal doctrine on 
the relationship between taxation and takings from the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries. Justice Cooley, a leading theorist and 
treatise author, and one sympathetic to an older, “classical” style of 
natural rights, distinguished the two as follows. 
When the state has need of the property of citizens for its 
sovereign purposes, it may lawfully appropriate it against the 
will of the owner either under the power to tax or the right of 
eminent domain. There is a difference in the two cases which 
is vital. When property is appropriated under the right of 
eminent domain, a particular item or parcel is taken, because 
for public purposes there is a special need of it, and the state 
takes it under proceedings which amount, so far as the owner 
is concerned, to a forced sale. But taxation is based upon the 
idea of calling upon the people for equal and proportional 
contributions to the public wants, that the burdens of 
government may fall ratably upon all who in justice should 
bear them. 
This classical conception of distinguishing taxes from takings stresses 
two points. First, taxes fall on “the people,” (i.e., a large swath of the 
population) instead of one or a few property owners as is invariably 
the case for takings. Second, takings involve prices for specific assets 
(“forced sale”), but taxes are subject to a less exacting definition: taxes 
must (i) ”be equal and proportional,” two words which are far from 
synonymous; and (ii) ”fall ratably upon all who in justice should bear 
them.” Justice Cooley’s articulation of this “classical” approach to 
distinguishing taxes from takings thus sounds little like modern 
natural property rights theories’ straitjacket reading of the Takings 
Clause. In another important departure from the straitjacket we have 
documented, Justice Cooley and his contemporaries also asserted that 
taxation was one of the foundational powers ceded to the legislature 
and that judges should strike down tax laws only in the most extreme 
cases of overreach. As Justice Cooley put it, “[t]he power of taxation is 
a great governmental attribute, with which the courts have very wisely 
shown extreme unwillingness to interfere . . . .”239 
The Continuous Burden Principle offers a way to operationalize this 
traditional understanding of the extent to which takings law applies to 
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taxation. The essential idea is that to determine whether or not there 
has been a taking, we look for discontinuous jumps in the marginal 
burdens that a given tax imposes. Both italicized words in the previous 
sentence require elaboration. A discontinuous jump is a relatively 
large increase in the burden imposed by the tax. Marginal refers to the 
difference between the burden imposed on one or a few people subject 
to the highest exactions under the tax, and those facing the next 
highest burden. 
Some examples will illustrate the basic workings of the CBP. First, 
consider the taking of a single house to build a road. If the 
government does not pay compensation, then the owner of the 
targeted property suffers a relatively large loss while everyone else 
suffers no loss and indeed likely a small gain from obtaining the use of 
a new road with fewer tax dollars spent. This clearly violates the CBP: 
the marginal difference between the burden on the owner and the next 
most burdened citizen is quite large — a discontinuous jump in the 
burden that violates the Continuous Burden Principle. Thus, in this 
canonical case of a taking, the CBP unsurprisingly dovetails with 
current, longstanding Takings Clause doctrine. 
Let us now turn to two contrasting tax regimes. First, Massey’s “Bill 
Gates” tax that imposed a much higher tax rate on the taxpayer with 
the highest income than on the second highest earner would amount 
to a discontinuous burden on the top marginal taxpayer.240 This 
violates the CBP and so would amount to a taking under the standard. 
The government would have to refund the incremental burden 
imposed on Gates as just compensation. Any government anticipating 
this result would know better than to even bother trying to impose 
that particular tax rate. 
In sharp contrast, consider the progressive rate structure of the 
current federal income tax. Marginal rates for married taxpayers filing 
jointly range from 10% on incomes up to $18,550, then rates of 15%, 
25%, 28%, 33%, 35%, and finally 39.6% for couples with joint incomes 
above $466,950.241 This means that the top rate, 39.6%, applies to a 
fairly large number of American households. Thus, the group facing 
the highest burden does not consist of one person or a handful of 
households. Further, given the workings of an income tax based on 
 
 240 Arguably such a tax would violate the constitutional stricture against bills of 
attainder (legislative punishment of individuals without benefit of trial). U.S. CONST. 
art I, § 9, cl. 3 (barring national Congress from passing bills of attainder); id. § 10, 
cl. 1 (parallel ban on state legislatures). 
 241 Kyle Pomerleau, 2016 Tax Brackets, TAX FOUND. (Oct. 14, 2015), 
http://taxfoundation.org/article/2016-tax-brackets. 
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marginal rates, the burden cannot take a discontinuous jump from the 
party most highly burdened and the next most burdened taxpayer. 
America has many multi-millionaires whose effective (average) income 
tax rate is very close to the top marginal rate, 39.6%, because their 
incomes are so high that the vast majority of their income is taxed at 
this top marginal rate. Thus, in keeping with history, precedent, and 
the anti-singling-out purpose of the Takings Clause, the current 
progressive federal income tax easily passes constitutional muster 
under the CBP. 
Indeed, it would take a tax almost as extreme as the Bill Gates tax to 
violate the CBP. To give one more example, imagine that the bottom 
90% of the income distribution elected legislators charged with 
imposing even a modest income tax, say a flat 25%, on the top 10% of 
taxpayers in the income distribution but no taxes on themselves. This 
would violate the CBP. There would be a discontinuous jump in the 
tax rate between the person with the highest income who did not pay 
the tax and the lowest-income taxpayer among those subject to the 
tax: the former would pay a rate of 0%, the latter 25%. That is a clear 
discontinuous jump in the burden imposed by the tax. 
Based on the CBP, I conclude that natural property rights theory 
errs in arguing that any progressive income tax is a taking. It follows, 
as a necessary corollary drawn in Part I of this Article, that the 
contention that any regressive tax is a taking is also in error. That said, 
the Takings Clause does impose some limits on the power of taxation. 
Given that its animating purpose is to avoid singling out one or a few 
citizens to bear an unfairly large portion of the burdens of producing 
public goods, the CBP provides a cogent framework for drawing the 
line between taxes that do and do not effectuate such singling out. 
CONCLUSION 
The flexibility of the CBP, permitting a wide range of tax structures 
(including both progressive and regressive options), stands in stark 
contrast to the straitjacket imposed on tax policy by the natural rights 
visions of the Takings Clause. A reading of the Takings Clause that 
forecloses all possible income tax rate structure save one, the flat tax, 
removes virtually all flexibility in using the income tax to address 
changing circumstances. Moreover, natural property rights readings of 
the Takings Clause have deleterious impacts in other crucial policy 
domains. In particular, they would paralyze the monetary authorities’ 
ability to manage a protean world and keep the economy on track. 
Previous scholarship has not highlighted these enormous hazards 
pregnant in natural property rights theory. Shedding light on the 
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harmful straitjacket that the theory would impose in key policymaking 
areas is thus the most novel, important contribution made in this 
Article. 
The Article also sheds new light on the more commonly discussed 
question of the constitutionality of redistributive policies. It highlights 
important and unappreciated flaws in the natural rights case against 
redistribution: in particular, the failure to take seriously the fact that 
charity is a public good and the failure to understand the implications 
of choosing different tax bases when calling for a flat tax. 
Given these fundamental shortcomings, it is hard not to ask: what 
explains the seemingly seductive allure of natural property rights 
theory to conservative scholars and judicial appointees? One obvious, 
cynical answer is that natural property rights support policies that are 
quite favorable to those of wealth and influence. Progressive taxation 
of income and estates, for example, tend to undermine existing 
socioeconomic hierarchies. 
In the interest of avoiding cynicism and instead imputing the best 
motives possible to fellow scholars, let us assume instead that the 
appeal of natural property rights theory arises from its austere 
intellectual beauty. The natural property rights theory of the Takings 
Clause proceeds from a compact set of simple axioms and builds an 
impressive intellectual edifice on this foundation clearly and cogently. 
It is beautiful, however, only in the abstract. Natural property rights 
axioms, the foundation for the theory’s assertions, are its tragic flaws. 
In order to address the messy real world that for better or worse we 
inhabit, we must leave behind geometric precision and return to the 
disorderly real world of social science, in which there are no precise 
and eternal solutions (like the flat tax) to difficult policy questions 
(like the proper way to fund the state). The natural rights straitjacket 
is simply unsuited to regulating taxation, monetary policy, and other 
critical governmental operations. The most important issue is not 
progressivity or regressivity. It is flexibility. 
